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 Designing messages that successfully produce behavior change is a central objective for 
many health communication scholars. However, many health campaigns fail to effectively 
produce desired behavioral behavior, and occasionally boomerang effects can result in audience 
members adopting behaviors opposite of the recommended action. Psychological reactance 
theory – which posits that individuals cherish their personal freedoms, and react negatively when 
their freedom is threatened – provides a theoretical account for why persuasive messages can fail. 
The current study extends the literature on psychological reactance theory in two primary ways. 
First, by examining the role of descriptive and injunctive norms messages as antecedents to 
freedom threat and reactance. Second, by examining message elaboration as an antecedent and 
moderator of the reactance process. In Study 1, college students (N = 405) were randomly 
assigned to view print ads using a 3 (norms message: descriptive norm vs. injunctive norm vs. 
control) X 2 (forceful language: high vs. low) X 2 (topic: alcohol consumption, regular exercise) 
between subjects posttest only design. In Study 2, adult Internet users (N = 655) were randomly 
assigned to view print ads using a 2 (descriptive norm: present vs. absent) X 2 (injunctive norm: 
present vs. absent) X 2 (forceful language: high vs. low) X 2 (topic: organ donation, energy 
conservation) between-subjects posttest only design posttest only design.  
 Four general conclusions are drawn from this investigation. First, descriptive and 
injunctive norms messages did not affect perceived descriptive or injunctive norms across all 
four topics and two populations. In other words, the norms message inductions consistently 
failed. This result is likely due to a confluence of factors, including the fact that the current 
studies made comparisons between two norms message frames, as well as a no-norm control 




is more typical in the literature), the use of quite distal referent groups in the messages 
(“University students” and “Americans”), as well as the relatively short (~50 words) nature of 
the print messages. Second, despite following the two-step approach to modeling reactance in the 
current studies, modification indices for three of the four models suggested the addition of a 
direct path from an exogenous variable to state reactance. Given the lack of uniformity in the 
reactance literature in regards to how reactance is modeled vis-à-vi freedom threat, the current 
study holds implications for scholars interested in the operationalization of reactance. Third, the 
findings of the current investigation also have theoretical implications for theories of message 
processing such as the elaboration likelihood model. Across all four topics, greater message 
elaboration was associated with either diminished freedom threat (alcohol, organ donation) or 
diminished reactance (exercise, energy conservation), suggesting that reactance reduction is 
another persuasive benefit of greater message elaboration. Fourth, an interaction between 
message elaboration and forceful language was observed in the exercise sample. The interaction 
was such that under conditions of greater message elaboration and the presence of forceful 
language, freedom threat was diminished. Though this finding seems rather counterintuitive on 
its face, it may be the case that in some cases (i.e., under high elaboration) audience members 
appreciate forceful message for their frankness. Given, however, that this interaction was 
observed for only one topic (regular exercise), generalizing this finding to other topics is 
premature. Practical implications of the current findings are also discussed, as well as limitations 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Crafting messages that successfully engender behavior change is a central objective for 
many health communication scholars (Rice & Atkin, 2012). Many of the actual causes of death 
in the United States – including tobacco use, dietary behaviors, physical inactivity, alcohol 
consumption, and sexual practices – are behavior-related, and therefore preventable (Mokdad, 
Marks, Stroup, & Gerberding, 2004). Given this, a continued understanding of communication 
strategies for health promotion and disease prevention is essential for improving the health of 
individuals and populations (Painter, Borba, Hynes, Mays, & Glanz, 2008). However, it is clear 
that many health campaigns are often ineffective at producing desired behavior change (Anker, 
Feeley, McCracken, & Lagoe, 2016; Noar, 2009; Snyder et al., 2004). Furthermore, in some 
cases, persuasive health messages can result in audience members adopting behaviors opposite 
of the recommended action (Byrne & Hart, 2009; Hornik, 2002). In attempting to account for the 
failure of persuasive messages and campaigns to produce behavior change, a commonly relied 
upon theoretical framework is psychological reactance theory (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 
1981). 
Psychological reactance theory (PRT) rests on the assumption that individuals cherish 
freedom, choice, and autonomy (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Consequently, when an 
external stimulus – such as a persuasive message – is perceived to threaten, hinder, or eliminate 
an individuals’ freedom to choose among an established freedom, an adverse motivational state 
known as psychological reactance is hypothesized to occur. Reactance is operationalized as an 
amalgamation of anger and negative cognitions (Dillard & Shen, 2005), which in turn motivates 
individuals to behave in ways aimed at restoring their threatened or lost freedom (Brehm, 1966). 
As health campaigns and messages often directly discourage unhealthy behaviors, or in the case 




health messages are often inherently freedom threatening. That is, messages designed to 
influence another person represents a threat to one’s freedom. From a health promotion 
standpoint, the arousal of psychological reactance is often an undesirable outcome that should be 
avoided when possible. Considerable research has demonstrated that the experience of state 
reactance is associated with a host of undesirable persuasive outcomes, including unfavorable 
message appraisals (Grandpre, Alvaro, Burgoon, Miller, & Hall, 2003; Quick & Considine, 
2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2007a; Shen, 2010, 2011, 2015), unfavorable source appraisals 
(LaVoie, Quick, Riles, & Lambert, 2017; Miller, Lane, Deatrick, Young, & Potts, 2007; Quick & 
Bates, 2010), lower perceived message persuasiveness (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2007a), diminished attitudes (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick, 2012; Quick, Kam, 
Morgan, Montero Liberona, & Smith, 2015; Shen, 2010, 2011, 2015), and decreased behavioral 
intentions (Quick & Kim, 2009; Quick & Stephenson, 2008; Rains & Turner, 2007). These 
findings underline an inherent contradiction that exists when crafting persuasive health 
messages; persuasive messages must by necessity be direct in advocating for the recommended 
action, yet must also balance this need with the inherent consequences of threatening individuals’ 
freedom to choose (Rains, 2013). 
Considering the undesirable consequences of psychological reactance, scholars in recent 
years have increasingly been interested in identifying message features that are more (or less) 
likely to elicit reactance (for a review, see Quick, Shen, & Dillard, 2013). To date, the majority 
of reactance studies have found that messages featuring explicit, vivid, and concrete language 
with a clear intent to persuade will arouse a greater freedom threat than implicit, non-vivid, non-
forceful, and non-controlling messages (see Rains, 2013 for a recent meta-analysis). In 




for messages utilizing restoration postscripts (Bessarabova, Fink, & Turner, 2013; Miller et al., 
2007), gain-frame messages (Cho & Sands, 2011; Reinhart, Marshall, Feeley, & Tutzauer, 2007; 
Shen, 2015), narrative delivery style (Gardner & Leshner, 2015; Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010), 
novelty (Quick, 2013; Xu, 2015), empathetic language (Shen, 2010, 2011), other-referencing 
(Gardner & Leshner, 2016), inoculation messages (Richards & Banas, 2015; Richards, Banas, & 
Magid, 2017), and provision of choice (Reynolds-Tylus, Martinez Gonzalez, & Quick, 2018; 
Shen, 2015). Despite these advances, a continued understanding of message features that are 
more or less likely to elicit psychological reactance is critical, as messages that incite reactance 
can often be ineffective at (or even antithetical to) promoting desired behavior change. In short, a 
continued understanding of the message features likely to arouse or diminish reactance provides 
us with not only a stronger theoretical understanding of psychological reactance, but also 
empirically supported practical advice for campaign efforts. 
The current dissertation sets out to advance the literature on psychological reactance in 
several ways. First, the primary aim of this dissertation is to examine descriptive and injunctive 
norms messages as antecedents to psychological reactance, and in the process, to situate PRT 
within the broader social norms literature. In recent years, there has been great interest in the 
study of normative influence as a communication strategy for behavior change (Mollen, Rimal, 
& Lapinski, 2010; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015; Yanovitzky & Rimal, 2006). In short, social norms 
can be broadly defined as individuals’ perceptions of behavior that is accepted and expected in 
given situations, with perceived descriptive norms reflecting perceptions about what is 
commonly done by others, and perceived injunctive norms reflecting perceptions about what is 
commonly approved or disapproved of by others (Kallgren, Reno, & Caildini, 2000). The 




misperceptions surrounding a health behavior can lead to behavior change (Berkowitz, 2004; 
Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986). Although some research supports the utility of social norms 
campaigns for behavior change (Neighbors, Lee, Lewis, Fossos, & Larimer, 2007; Perkins & 
Berkowitz, 1986; Perkins & Craig, 2006; Perkins, Meilman, Leichlier, Cashin, & Presley, 1999; 
Stewart et al., 2002), other work has found mixed or inconsistent support (Borsari & Carey, 
2003; Campo & Cameron, 2006; Campo, Cameron, Brossard, & Frazzer, 2004; Wechsler et al., 
2003). In response to these contradictory findings, recent scholarship has focused on 
understanding the underlying cognitive processes affecting normative influence (Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005; Rimal, 2008; Rimal & Real, 2003, 2005). Although a commonly cited rationale for 
the use of social norms campaigns is that norms messages are less likely to engender resistance 
in the form of psychological reactance (Rimal, 2008; Wechsler et al., 2003), surprisingly this 
question has yet to be systematically examined using a validated operationalization of reactance 
(Dillard & Shen, 2005). As PRT offers a viable framework for understanding resistance to 
persuasive messages, a closer examination of the reactance process will likely lend continued 
explanation behind the inconsistent findings on the effectiveness of social norms campaigns. 
Furthermore, an examination of descriptive and injunctive norms messages will add to the 
reactance literature by meeting Quick and colleagues’ (2013) call for a more nuanced 
understanding of message features that successfully mitigate or galvanize reactance. 
The second goal of the current investigation is to examine message elaboration as an 
antecedent and moderator of the reactance process. Dual-processing models of persuasion 
including the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986: Petty & Wegener, 1999) 
and the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999) emphasize the 




persuasive message. A major takeaway from the message processing literature is that the effect 
of a message variable can differ depending on the depth of processing that occurs (O’Keefe, 
2013). Interestingly, however, no work to date has examined the direct effect of message 
elaboration on reactance, nor the moderating role of message elaboration in the context of 
message variables such as language forcefulness (i.e., choice-restricting language or choice-
enhancing language). An examination of these constructs contributes not only to our 
understanding of PRT (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981), but also to the broader message 
processing literature (Chaiken, 1980; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). 
With the overarching goals of the current dissertation put forth, the following chapters are 
briefly outlined. Chapter 2 provides an overview of PRT, including an overview of key 
constructs, discussion of major theoretical principles, a summary of methods for measuring and 
modeling psychological reactance, as well as a review of contemporary PRT research. Chapter 3 
outlines the contributions of the current dissertation and introduces the formal hypotheses and 
research questions. Chapter 4 and 5 report the method and results for Study 1 and Study 2, 
respectively. Chapter 6 includes the discussion and major conclusions of the dissertation, with an 





CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
PRT explains how individuals react when their freedom is threatened or eliminated 
(Brehm, 1966). The underlying assumption of PRT is that individuals cherish established 
freedoms, the ability to choose among alternatives, and individual autonomy. As individuals 
value their freedom to choose among alternatives, PRT proposes that when a specific freedom is 
threatened or eliminated, individuals will be motivationally aroused to restore their threatened or 
lost freedom (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Therefore, PRT provides a theoretical 
account for specifying how freedoms may be eliminated or threatened, as well as the effects that 
reactance produces following the threat or elimination of said freedoms.  
PRT is a commonly relied upon theoretical framework among health communication 
researchers to understand resistance to persuasive messages. In contrast to constructs and 
theories commonly employed to predict and explain successful persuasive attempts, PRT is 
commonly invoked to provide an explanation for why a particular persuasive message or 
campaign failed (e.g., Hornik, Jacobsohn, Orwin, Piesse, & Kalton, 2008; Ringold, 2002). The 
central goal of many health campaigns is either to discourage unhealthy behaviors (e.g., smoking, 
excessive drinking) or to successfully reinforce or activate healthy behaviors (e.g., vegetable 
consumption, exercise). Nevertheless, it is clear that in many cases these campaigns often fail to 
achieve their desired objectives (Noar, 2009; Snyder et al., 2004), and in some cases, can even 
lead to audience members adopting behaviors opposite of the recommended action (Byrne & 
Hart, 2009; Hornik, 2002). Unfortunately, resistance to persuasion is not only common (Knowles 
& Lin, 2004), but is pragmatically frustrating for researchers and campaign designers (Quick et 
al., 2013). A major strength of PRT is that the theory provides testable theoretical principles that 




theoretical principles of PRT, as well as the relevant research in support of each principle, 
attention is first given to four key theoretical constructs: (a) freedom, (b) threat to freedom, (c) 
reactance, and (d) restoration of freedom. 
Overview of Key Constructs 
Freedom 
 The foundational premise of PRT rests on the notion of freedoms. Freedoms are beliefs 
individuals hold about the ways in which they may act (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
PRT assumes that for a given person, there are a multitude of freedoms that he or she perceives 
can be engaged in either at the moment or at some time in the future (Brehm, 1966). As freedoms 
are subjective realities that are developed cognitively over time, there is considerable variation 
between individuals in respect to the number of unique freedoms they perceive (Brehm & Brehm, 
1981). Freedoms are defined broadly in PRT to include actions, emotions, thoughts, as well as 
attitudes (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974). Individuals are said to possess 
specific freedoms to the extent that they have knowledge that the freedom exists, and perceive 
they are able to act on that freedom. As stated by the theorists themselves, “If a person knows 
that he or she can do X [or think X, or believe X, or feel X], then X is a specific, behavioral 
freedom for that person” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 12). Thus, according to PRT, a freedom can 
only be threatened or eliminated once it is established. Freedoms that are not perceived to exist 
by definition cannot be threatened or eliminated, and thus, cannot elicit reactance (Brehm, 1966).  
 As PRT conceives freedoms as creations of subjective realities, the necessary and 
sufficient prerequisite for a freedom to exist is simply that individuals hold the subjective 
perception that they can exercise a particular freedom. As stated by Brehm and Brehm (1981), 




freedom exists according to some more objective criteria” (p. 22). Although there clearly may be 
consequences for a person who perceives a freedom to exist that physical reality does not permit 
(e.g., walking to the moon), as long as an individual holds belief in this freedom earnestly, the 
specified consequences of reactance as postulated by PRT are expected to still apply (Brehm, 
1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
Threat to Freedom 
 Given that individuals perceive specific freedoms, anything that makes enacting these 
freedoms more difficult constitutes a legitimate threat to freedom (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). Some examples of freedom threats include attempts at social influence, 
impersonal events, or even behaviors on behalf of the individual that make performing a 
particular freedom more difficult (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). For instance, individuals may 
experience a threat to their freedom in the form of social influence attempts, such as when 
communicators use domineering or commanding language (Grandpre et al., 2003; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2008), demonstrate clear intent to persuade (Benoit, 1998; Wood & Quinn, 2003), 
or rely on well-known compliance-gaining techniques (Cialdini, 2007). Impersonal events, 
which may include the passage of laws, shortages in materials or products, and events of social 
or natural origin (e.g., earthquakes) can also threaten individuals’ freedoms (Brehm & Brehm, 
1981). Finally, threats to freedom can also come from one’s own behavior, such as when an 
individual’s decisions or preferences interfere with their ability to exercise a particular freedom 
(e.g., when the choice of one alternative means the rejection of another). In sum, although it is 
often the case that freedom threats are social in nature, it is not a necessary condition that the 





In the context of persuasion, threats to freedom are most often attempts at social 
influence. For instance, after being exposed to a persuasive message, people may feel threatened 
in their freedom to: (a) exhibit a particular attitude or behavior, (b) change an existing attitude or 
behavior, or (c) avoid committing to a position or behavior (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 
1974). To a certain extent, all persuasive attempts can be considered a threat to one’s freedom 
(Burgoon, Alvaro, Grandpre, & Voulodakis, 2002). Thus, promotional health messages by their 
very nature may inherently threaten an individual’s freedom, as health messages often directly 
discourage unhealthy behaviors or directly encourage healthy behaviors. Thus, an inherent 
contradiction exists for campaign designers interested in designing effective health messages. 
Persuasive messages must by necessity be unequivocal in advocating for the recommended 
action, yet must also balance this need with the inherent consequences of threatening individuals’ 
freedom to choose the right course of action for themselves (Rains, 2013). PRT provides one 
lens in which researchers can examine message and source features that are more or less likely to 
lead to reactance arousal. Based on this literature, it is clear that persuasive messages differ in the 
magnitude by which they elicit freedom threat, and subsequently, impact relevant persuasive 
outcomes (see Quick et al., 2013). 
 One final note of importance; in PRT the term ‘threat’ is often used synonymously with 
the term ‘freedom threat.’ However, when used in the context of PRT, the term threat is 
conceptually distinct from its general usage in everyday language (e.g., “He threatened to fire me 
if I kept coming in late”). Furthermore, the usage of the term threat within PRT is also distinct 




literature on fear appeals1 (see Popova, 2012; Witte, 1992, 1994), as well as research within the 
tradition of inoculation theory2 (see Compton, 2013; McGuire, 1961, 1964). 
Psychological Reactance 
 Psychological reactance is “the motivational state that is hypothesized to occur when a 
freedom is eliminated or threatened with elimination” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 37). Reactance 
is the key mediator and central explanatory construct of PRT. Reactance is hypothesized to occur 
as individuals place a high value on the need for self-determination in influencing their own 
environment (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974). Although any persuasive 
communication holds the potential to arouse reactance if it threatens or eliminates a previously 
held freedom, the magnitude of reactance aroused is largely a direct function of the perceived 
attractiveness, or importance, of the threatened or eliminated freedom (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). Though for many years a validated operationalization of reactance was elusive, 
contemporary research has demonstrated that reactance is best operationalized as an 
amalgamation of anger and negative cognitions (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick, 2012; Rains, 
2013). 
 Though Brehm (1966) initially conceptualized psychological reactance as a 
psychological state, he did leave open the possibility of individual differences in responding to 
                                               
1 Research within the tradition of the extended parallel process model (EPPM; Witte, 1992, 1994) has 
conceptualized threat as both a component of the fear appeal message as well as an individual’s subjective 
evaluation of the message. Threat as a message component is comprised of message features that provide 
information about the severity of the threatening event and the target population’s susceptibility to the threatening 
event. For instance, in a typical EPPM study messages are experimentally manipulated to be either high threat (i.e., 
high susceptibility and high severity information is included in the message) or low threat (i.e., low susceptibility 
and low severity information is included in the message). Threat as a subjective evaluation is an individual’s 
cognitive evaluation of the message (i.e., perceived severity and susceptibility to the threatening event). Though this 
distinction is often overlooked in practice, manipulation checks generally – although not always – reveal that high 
threat messages often elicit high subjective evaluations of perceived severity and susceptibility (see Popova, 2012).  
2 Threat in inoculation theory is conceptualized not as a property of the message, but rather as a message response. 
More specifically, threat is defined as a recognized vulnerability that an existing attitudinal position once thought 
safe from change may be at risk. When a potential threat to one’s position is exposed, inoculation theory posits that 




freedom-threatening stimuli. Later work by Brehm and Brehm (1981) recognized reactance as an 
individual difference variable, as individuals vary in their needs for autonomy and self-
determination (Wicklund, 1974). Highly reactant individuals are characterized by a resistance to 
rules and regulations, high desire for autonomy, high defensiveness, and low concern for social 
norms (Dowd, Wallbrown, Sanders, & Yesenosky, 1994; Seibel & Dowd, 2001). Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, reactance prone individuals are more likely to engage in risky health behaviors 
such as tobacco use (Miller, Burgoon, Grandpre, & Alvaro, 2006) and risky sexual behaviors 
(Miller & Quick, 2010). In the context of persuasive messaging, research shows that individuals 
exhibiting greater reactance proneness experience greater freedom threats, and therefore are 
more resistant to persuasive attempts (LaVoie et al., 2017; Quick, Scott, & Ledbetter, 2011; 
Quick & Stephenson, 2008). 
Restoration of Freedom 
 The fourth component of the theory, restoration of freedom, encapsulates the potential 
consequences occurring as a result of reactance arousal. PRT contends that when a perceived 
freedom is threatened or eliminated, individuals will be motivated to reestablish that freedom 
(Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Inherent to this prediction is the understanding that 
reactance is “a motivational state and as such is assumed to have energizing and behavior-
directing properties” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 98). Specifically, PRT proposes that individuals 
may act upon this motivation to restore their freedom either directly or indirectly. Direct 
restoration may include directly engaging in an admonished behavior (e.g., consuming alcohol 
after exposure to an anti-drinking message), or by resisting an advocated behavior (e.g., refusing 
a flu vaccination after exposure to a pro-flu vaccination message). This type of direct restoration 




1953; Quick & Stephenson, 2007b), and is perhaps the most intuitive manifestation of freedom 
restoration. 
Considering that direct restoration is not always feasible or suitable, PRT also proposes 
that individuals may also act to restore their freedom in more indirect ways (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Quick & Stephenson, 2007b). Indirect restoration may include such 
responses as increasing one’s liking of the threatened choice (Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban, 
1966; Hammock & Brehm, 1966), vicariously performing the threatened behavior by observing 
others acting in a freedom restoring manner (Quick & Stephenson, 2007b), derogating the source 
of the freedom threat (Kohn & Barnes, 1977; Schwarz, Frey, & Kumpf, 1980; Smith, 1977; 
Worchel, 1974), denying the existence of the threat (Worchel & Andreoli, 1974; Worchel, 
Andreoli, & Archer, 1976), or by exercising a related freedom to regain feelings of control and 
choice (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974). For example, in response to an anti-binge 
drinking message, individuals experiencing reactance may choose to restore their freedom by 
increasing their liking for binge-drinking, by associating themselves with those who binge drink, 
by derogating the source of the message, by denying that binge-drinking is a significant problem, 
or by using a related substance such as marijuana or cigarettes. In line with this prediction, 
considerable research within the field of health communication has demonstrated that 
psychological reactance is associated with a host of undesirable outcomes, including unfavorable 
message (Grandpre et al., 2003) and source appraisals (Miller et al., 2007), as well as decreased 
attitudes (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick, 2012) and intentions (Rains & Turner, 2007) toward the 
advocated behaviors. With the major theoretical constructs of PRT explicated, the next section 





Theoretical Principles of PRT 
Four theoretical principles underline PRT (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; 
Wicklund, 1974). The first principle specifies a boundary condition for the theory, namely that 
reactance will only result if individuals believe they have freedom over a particular outcome. 
The second, third, and fourth principles provide testable hypotheses on the nature of reactance in 
response to freedom threats, namely, what factors are expected to increase perceptions of a 
freedom threat. Specifically, principle two proposes that as a threatened freedom becomes more 
attractive, reactance is expected to increase. Principles three and four predict, correspondingly, 
that as the number of explicit freedom threats and implied freedom threats increases, the 
magnitude of reactance is also expected to increase (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; 
Wicklund, 1974).  
Principle 1 
The first principle of PRT states that reactance can only be aroused if individuals believe 
they have freedom over a particular outcome (Brehm, 1966). Therefore, in order for reactance to 
occur, an individual must both know that a freedom exists, as well as believe they have the 
ability and confidence to successfully exercise that freedom (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). In line 
with this principle, research has shown that reactance is related to self-esteem (Brockner & 
Elkind, 1985) and perceived competence (Wicklund & Brehm, 1968). Consequently, individuals 
tend to be particularly sensitive regarding freedoms they believe themselves both worthy of 
having and capable of enacting.  
The earliest experimental evidence supporting the first principle of PRT comes from 
Wicklund and Brehm (1968). In their study, male participants were recruited for the task of 




competent or incompetent in this task. Following their assessment, some participants received a 
communication ostensibly from a fellow participant that was freedom restricting (“There is no 
question about it; Paul is the best”), whereas others simply received a more neutral 
communication about the other participant’s position on the job applicant (“Paul is the best”). 
Consistent with their prediction, Wicklund and Brehm (1968) found that for those participants 
perceiving high competence in their abilities, exposure to a freedom-restricting message led to 
higher reactance in the form of attitude change away from the position advocated by the 
confederate. No significant difference emerged between the freedom-restricting and neutral 
communication conditions for those individuals who perceived incompetence in their abilities to 
evaluate the candidate. In other words, only when individuals were made aware of their 
competence in enacting a particular freedom did exposure to a freedom-restricting message lead 
to outcomes consistent with the arousal of reactance. 
Principle 2 
 The second principle of PRT concerns the relationship between the importance of a 
particular freedom and the magnitude of reactance experienced when that freedom is threatened. 
In particular, PRT predicts that as the importance of the threatened freedom increases, so will the 
amount of reactance aroused when that freedom is threatened. In early experiments testing this 
principle, the importance of the threatened freedom was manipulated by telling participants that 
their performance on a task would indicate important aspects of their personality (Brehm, 1966), 
that the task was a measure of their intelligence (Wicklund, 1974), that the task was for an 
important scientific project (Brehm & Cole, 1966), and that their performance on the task, if 
accurate, would be rewarded with a considerable sum of money (Brehm & Mann, 1975). In 




respectively, informing participants that data collection was only being used for preliminary data 
(Brehm, 1966), that the task measured nothing of psychological significance (Wicklund, 1974), 
that the data being collected were for a student friend, and of no consequence (Brehm & Cole, 
1966), and that the potential financial reward for an accurate task performance was fairly small 
(Brehm & Mann, 1975). A major limitation of many of these aforementioned experimental 
manipulations was that the importance of a freedom essentially amounted to the experimenter 
telling the participant that the behavior in the experiment was either important or not. 
Accordingly, these manipulations may not have necessarily represented freedoms that held 
unique instrumental value for the participant (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). 
Unique instrumental value refers to “whether or not a given behavior is the only way to 
satisfy a given need” (Brehm & Brehm, 1981, p. 38), and is a necessary condition for the 
predictions of the second principle of PRT. In the original formulation of the theory, the 
importance of a freedom was defined as an interactive product of “the unique instrumental value 
which the behavior has for the satisfaction of needs, multiplied by the actual or potential 
maximum magnitude of the need” (Brehm, 1966, pp. 4-5). Moreover, as Brehm and Brehm 
(1981) note, “for a freedom to be important, then, the minimum prerequisites are that the free 
behavior be perceived as potentially need-satisfying and that no other free behavior be perceived 
as available that would satisfy this exact same need” (pp. 38-39). Stated differently, in order for a 
freedom to be important to a person, it must hold some unique instrumental value in satisfying 
one or more important needs (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Thus, according to PRT, if the behavior 
in question does not hold unique instrumental value for the person, then the importance of the 
freedom is hypothesized to be an insignificant predictor of freedom threat regardless of the 




then the importance of the freedom will vary as a function of the magnitude of the need (Brehm 
& Brehm, 1981). In short, the importance of a particular freedom should only moderate the 
magnitude of reactance experienced if that particular freedom fulfills some unique role in 
satisfying a given need for an individual. 
As mentioned previously, a critical limitation of many of the early experimental studies 
testing the second principle of PRT was the failure to ensure that the freedom being threatened or 
eliminated held unique instrumental value for study participants. One example of later work 
overcoming this limitation comes from Bensley and Wu (1991), who conducted a two-study 
experiment on reactance to anti-drinking messages among college students. In their first study, 
535 undergraduate students were recruited to evaluate alcohol prevention materials adapted from 
popular press sources. In the final paragraph of the message, participants were randomly 
assigned to either a high-threat (“any reasonable person must acknowledge these conclusions”) 
or low-threat (“We believe that these conclusions are reasonable”) concluding statement. The 
recommended response was also varied across conditions; with the concluding statement either 
advocating for controlled drinking or complete abstinence from alcohol. Participants were 
classified either as abstainers (“never drink,” n = 96), occasional drinkers (“drink at least once a 
year but less than once a month,” n = 126), light/moderate drinkers (“drink at least once a month 
but no more than 3-4 drinks each time,” n = 223), and heavy drinkers (“drink nearly every day or 
weekly, often 5 or more drinks each time,” n = 90). The results indicated that the high-threat 
messages were rated more negatively than the low-threat messages overall, and consequently 
resulted in higher drinking intentions. In line with the second principle of PRT, this effect was 
most pronounced for heavy drinkers and for participants who viewed the abstinence message 




In their second study, Bensley and Wu (1991) recruited 74 undergraduates who were at 
least 21 years old and identified as either light/moderate or heavy drinkers. Following exposure 
to either high-threat or low-threat written information about alcohol consumption, participants 
were given the opportunity to consume beer in an allegedly unrelated “evaluative judgments 
study.” In line with the authors’ predictions, participants exposed to the high-threat message 
consumed a third more beer than did those participants in the low-threat condition. This effect 
was most pronounced for male heavy drinkers exposed to the high-threat message, who drank 
significantly more than any other condition. Taken together, the results of both studies suggest 
that – in support of the second principle of PRT – reactance is enhanced as the importance of a 
threatened freedom increases. Furthermore, this effect is particularly pronounced when more 
forceful language is used (Bensley & Wu, 1991).  
Principle 3 
The third principle of PRT proposes that the amount of reactance aroused by a given 
threat is a direct function of the number and proportion of freedoms threatened. However, extant 
research has been inconsistent in supporting this principle (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). For instance, 
in a study by Grabitz-Gniech, Auslitz, and Grabitz (1975), both the size and array of freedoms 
threatened were covaried in order to examine the effect of both the number and proportion of 
freedoms threatened. In their study, the researchers first constructed a set of 12 modern art prints 
that were pilot tested to be equally attractive. Participants were then asked to rate the 
attractiveness of the prints, either all 12 or a subset of 6 prints, and were told they would be able 
to choose 1 of the prints for themselves at a later point. At a later session, the participants were 
informed that due to an error in shipment, some of the prints would not be available for selection. 




the most or least attractive print was eliminated. Both the number and proportion of prints 
eliminated were varied. For participants asked to choose from 1 of 6 prints, either 2 or 4 prints 
were eliminated, and for those asked to choose from 1 of 12 prints, either 4 or 8 prints were 
eliminated. After the participants knew which prints were eliminated, they were then asked to 
rerate all 6 or 12 prints on their attractiveness. The authors hypothesized that in line with PRT, 
the eliminated prints would be rated as more attractive, and this increase would be a direct 
function of both the number and proportion of freedoms eliminated. The results of this 
experiment, however, failed to support the theoretical predictions both for the number or 
proportion of freedoms threatened. In fact, in contrast to expectations, for those participants who 
had 12 prints to choose from and had either 4 or 8 eliminated, they actually decreased their rating 
of how attractive they found the eliminated choices. In sum, empirical work has failed to support 
the third principle of PRT. 
Principle 4 
 The fourth and final principle states that freedoms can be threatened by implication, and 
consequently the magnitude of reactance experienced will increase as a threat carries more 
implications for future freedom threats (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974). 
For instance, a threat to one’s present freedom may imply that threats to one’s future freedoms 
may occur (Brehm & Sensenig, 1966; Sensenig & Brehm, 1968). In a similar vein, threats 
directed at other people’s freedoms may imply that one’s own freedoms may also be at risk 
(Andreoli, Worchel, & Folger, 1974; Worchel & Brehm, 1971). For example, in Andreoli and 
colleagues’ (1974) study, female participants were brought into the lab and asked to initially rank 
order five topics for a future group discussion. Following this, the participants either observed a 




participants were then asked to rerate their preferences for discussion topics. In line with the 
hypothesis that reactance can be threatened by implication, in this case by observing another 
person’s freedom being threatened, the participants rated the attractiveness of the confederate’s 
preferred discussion topic higher when the confederate was excluded versus included in the 
decision-making process (Andreoli et al., 1974). 
Summary 
 According to PRT, reactance is likely to be aroused when individuals feel they are 
knowledgeable and competent to exercise a freedom, when the threatened freedom is one of 
personal importance, when the number and proportion of freedom threats increases, and when 
the number of implied freedom threats increases (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; 
Wicklund, 1974). However, despite considerable evidence in support of the basic principles of 
PRT, a major limitation plaguing PRT research for many years was the lack of a direct measure 
of reactance. Instead, researchers merely posited the existence of reactance based on observable 
outcomes such as source derogation (Smith, 1977), the adoption of positions or behaviors 
opposite from the advocated response (Worchel & Brehm, 1970), or increased liking for 
threatened choice (Hammock & Brehm, 1966). Stated differently, early researchers utilizing PRT 
examined antecedents to reactance, as well as consequences of reactance, but not reactance itself 
(for a review, see Burgoon et al., 2002). Despite this clear limitation, for years many scholars, 
including the original theorists themselves (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981), argued that 
reactance could not be measured directly. Correspondingly, without a way to measure reactance 
directly, the literature on PRT was significantly hampered for many years (Quick et al., 2013). It 
was not until communication scholars began to apply reactance within the context of persuasion 




will be discussed next, following the development of a validated operationalization of reactance 
(Dillard & Shen, 2005), more recent work has been able to further test and refine our 
understanding of PRT. 
Measurement and Modeling of the Reactance Process 
Despite the frequent attention paid to PRT, for many years the underlying processes 
explaining these outcomes remained unexplored. The theorists’ apparent reluctance to explicate 
reactance, the principle mechanism of PRT, may have been driven by their beliefs about the 
ability of scholars to adequately measure reactance. As stated by Brehm and Brehm (1981), 
“reactance has the status of an intervening, hypothetical variable…We cannot measure reactance 
directly [emphasis added], but hypothesizing its existence allows us to predict a variety of 
behavioral effects” (p. 37). The position that reactance cannot be measured directly is logically 
consequential, as for many years this viewpoint relegated reactance – the central and defining 
concept of the theory – to an indecipherable black box. Inputs go into the box and outcomes 
emerge, but the operations within the box itself were unknowable and mysterious. Without a 
direct measure of reactance available, when study findings emerged that were consistent with 
theoretical predictions, researchers could only speculate that reactance must have occurred. For 
instance, in Worchel and Brehm’s (1971) study, the selection of a solution in a decision-making 
task opposite of the solution forcefully advocated by a confederate was viewed as evidence that 
the participant experienced reactance. However, when findings emerge that were not in line with 
what would be predicted by the theory, questions persisted as to whether or not the observed 
results were due to the failure to successfully arouse reactance, or whether the findings were due 
to some issue with the manipulation, or study design. Unfortunately, without a validated 




mechanism when study findings indicated the persuasive appeal failed, or when boomerang 
effects were observed (Quick et al., 2013).  
Spearheading the efforts to validate a measurement of psychological reactance were 
Dillard and Shen (2005), who conducted a rigorous test of four distinct operationalizations of 
reactance in the contexts of flossing and student drinking. Dillard and Shen (2005) took issue 
with Brehm and Brehm’s (1981) position that reactance could not be measured directly, noting 
that the “primary limiting factor in the application of reactance theory to persuasive campaigns is 
the ephemeral nature of its central, explanatory construct” (p. 145). Building from the work of 
previous scholars, who throughout their application of PRT to various domains have implicitly 
and explicitly defined reactance in a variety of ways, Dillard and Shen (2005) identified four 
distinct possible ways to characterize reactance.  
In the first view, Dillard and Shen (2005) indicated that one potential way to 
conceptualize reactance is to view it as a purely cognitive process. This view, which they titled 
the single process cognitive model, draws from the cognitive response approach to persuasion 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) and clinical work on reactance (Kelly & Nauta, 1997). Dillard and 
Shen (2005) contend in this first perspective, reactance can be both conceived of and 
operationalized as counterarguing. According to this view, upon hearing or reading a freedom-
restricting message, individuals are expected to generate more unfavorable cognitions (i.e., 
counterarguments) to the message as a result of reactance (Silvia, 2006). From this purely 
cognitively viewpoint, reactance then may be best measured via self-report techniques of 
counterarguing, the most widely used of which is the thought-listing technique (Petty & 




A second possibility advanced by Dillard and Shen (2005) is that reactance may be best 
conceptualized as purely negative affect in the form of anger. This conceptualization, which they 
labeled the single process affective model, is consistent with descriptions of reactance as 
“hostility” (Berkowitz, 1973, p. 311) and “a negative emotional state” (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 
p. 571). In this view, reactance is seen as purely an emotional response. In accordance with this 
view, authors have cited similarities between antecedents of reactance and cognitive appraisals 
that lead to anger (Dillard & Meijenders, 2002; Nabi, 2002). In line with Brehm’s (1966) original 
description of reactance as the experience of hostile and aggressive feelings, reactance may then 
be viewed as more or less synonymous with a constellation of concepts that represent varying 
degrees of anger (e.g., irritation, annoyance, rage). Consistent with this position, the action 
tendencies associated with anger (i.e., attacking, rejecting; Dillard & Peck, 2001) are in line with 
the major predictions of PRT (Brehm, 1966, Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974). In 
operationalizing reactance then, this purely affective perspective would suggest that reactance is 
best operationalized by asking individuals to self-report the degree to which they are 
experiencing anger.  
Working from the notion that reactance might be considered either anger or 
counterarguments; Dillard and Shen (2005) proposed two potential conceptualizations of 
reactance featuring both affective and cognitive aspects. In a third possibility, reactance is 
conceptualized as a dual-process cognitive-affective model whereby anger and counterarguing 
serve separate and unique functions. In contrast to the first possibility (i.e., single process 
cognitive model) and the second possibility (i.e., single process affective model), in this third 
perspective, reactance is conceptualized as both counterarguing and anger. Yet these processes 




Leventhal’s (1970) parallel process model provides an exemplification of this reasoning. 
Specifically, Leventhal (1970) posits that individuals experience both cognitive and emotional 
reactions to persuasive health messages, and that these reactions have unique effects on message 
acceptance. Evidence consistent with Leventhal’s (1970) position has been documented in 
studies of cognitive and emotional responses to PSAs (Dillard & Peck, 2000, 2001; Dillard, 
Plotnick, Godbold, Freimuth, & Edgar, 1996; Stephenson, 2003; Witte, 1994).  
The fourth possibility proposed by Dillard and Shen (2005), the so-called intertwined 
process cognitive-affective model, is that reactance may be best considered as an amalgamation 
of affective and cognitive components. In contrast to the third position, which suggested unique 
and specifiable direct effects, in the fourth position cognition and affect are inseparably 
intertwined. Stated differently, the cognitive and affective components of reactance are entwined 
to such a degree that their effects on persuasive outcomes cannot be disentangled from one 
another. This position is consistent with the view of motivation as a combination of components, 
rather than a simple sum of distinct elements (as is implied by the third position; Dillard & Shen, 
2005). 
To determine how to best operationalize reactance, Dillard and Shen (2005) conducted 
two experiments comparing the two single-process models, the dual process model, and the 
intertwined model in the context of two health topics: alcohol consumption and flossing. 
Freedom threat was manipulated (high vs. low) and the four distinct conceptualizations of 
reactance were modeled as mediating the relationship between freedom threat (as well as 
reactance proneness, and the interaction between freedom threat and reactance proneness) and 
attitudes. Across both health topics, the intertwined model was found to best fit the data. 




contributed about equally to individuals’ motivation to restore their freedom. Hence, Dillard and 
Shen (2005) concluded that not only is reactance measurable, but that it is best operationalized as 
a combination of anger and negative cognitions. 
The intertwined model of reactance has been further supported by numerous studies. The 
first to do so was Rains and Turner (2007), who also examined a fifth possible model, whereby 
reactance is conceptualized as a two-step linear process with anger as the proximal antecedent to 
counterarguing. Similar to Dillard and Shen (2005), the results of Rains and Turner (2007) also 
supported the intertwined model as superior to the alternative conceptualizations. Further studies 
have also found support for the intertwined model as the best fitting model across various health 
contexts including alcohol consumption (Kim, Levine, & Allen, 2013; Quick & Bates, 2010; 
Richards & Banas, 2015; Richards et al., 2017), organ donation (Quick, 2012; Quick et al., 2015; 
Quick et al., 2011; Scott & Quick, 2012), physical activity (Quick & Considine, 2008), safer sex 
behaviors (Quick & Stephenson, 2007a), antismoking PSAs (Shen, 2010, 2011), graphic 
cigarette warning labels (LaVoie et al., 2017), and skin cancer prevention (Quick & Stephenson, 
2008; Shen, 2015). A meta-analysis by Rains (2013) (K = 20, N = 4,942) only lends further 
support to the intertwined model as the best fitting model for operationalizing reactance. 
Measuring Reactance 
 Dillard and Shen’s (2005) method for measuring reactance involves two procedures. In 
regards to anger, participants are asked to indicate on semantic-differential scales (0 = none of 
this feeling, 4 = a great deal of this feeling) to what degree the message they just read made them 
feel: (a) angry, (b) irritated, (c) annoyed, and (d) aggravated. Negative cognitions are assessed 
utilizing the thought-listing technique (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), whereby participants are asked 




then code participants’ responses in a four-step process whereby they: (a) unitize the data into 
psychological thought units, (b) identify and remove affective responses using a list of feeling 
terms compiled by Shaver, Schwartz, Kirson, and O’Connor (1987), (c) determine whether or 
not the cognitive responses are relevant or irrelevant to the message, and (d) code the relevant 
thoughts as either supportive, neutral, or negative. Negative cognitions are then subsequently 
retained and summed into a single scale to use for data analysis. 
 Following the burgeoning popularity of PRT, researchers began to reassess the validity of 
Dillard and Shen’s (2005) measure of psychological reactance. Though not the primary focus of 
her study, Lindsey (2005) developed an alternative measure of reactance to bone marrow 
donation messages using a four-item scale based on Hong’s Psychological Reactance Scale 
(Hong & Faedda, 1996). Given that communication scholars (LaVail, Anker, Reinhart, & Feeley, 
2010; Reinhart et al., 2007) have utilized Lindsey’s (2005) scale, Quick (2012) conducted a 
study to examine the reliability and validity of both Lindsey’s (2005) and Dillard and Shen’s 
(2005) measurements of reactance in order to establish which of the two measures represented 
the best measure of reactance. Though Quick (2012) found that both measures demonstrated 
acceptable reliability, he recommended the continued use of Dillard and Shen’s (2005) measure 
due to stronger validity. Specifically, the ability of Dillard and Shen’s (2005) measure of 
reactance to explain greater variance in attitude, reactance motivation, and source appraisals 
compared to Lindsey’s (2005) scale. Furthermore, Quick (2012) cautioned the continued use of 
Lindsey’s (2005) measure due to its inability to reliably distinguish freedom threat from 
reactance, a distinction that is consistent with Brehm’s (1966) earliest theorizing on PRT. 
Despite Quick’s (2012) recommendation in favor of Dillard and Shen’s (2005) scale, he did 




Accordingly, Quick (2012) recommended that continued efforts assess how to more effectively 
and efficiently operationalize reactance.  
 One method to more efficiently gauge reactance in general, and negative cognitions in 
particular, is the use of participant coding for assessing their cognitive responses (Rains & 
Turner, 2007; Quick & Stephenson, 2007a). Participant coding has been suggested due to two 
inherent limitations to Dillard and Shen’s (2005) technique for assessing negative cognitions. 
First, due to the training and time required to implement Dillard and Shen’s (2005) technique for 
assessing negative cognitions (i.e., thought unitization, screening out emotions, removing 
unrelated cognitions), this method is somewhat unwieldy, particularly outside of laboratory 
experiments. Second, and perhaps more critically, as thought-listing procedures often result in 
responses that are ambiguous in their very nature (e.g., “Is this claim true?”), researchers often 
are left to guess as to whether a participant’s thought is positive, negative, or neutral. The 
rationale for the use of participant coding of responses is straightforward, as by definition, 
research participants have more direct access to their own thoughts than do researchers. Hence, 
participants can feasibly provide more valid judgments as to the relevance and valence of their 
thoughts. Although participant coding of responses is a widely used and acceptable alternative 
(e.g., Rains & Turner, 2007; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), focused research has yet to 
systematically evaluate whether participant coding does indeed provide more valid judgments 
than trained coders. 
 Other work attempting to more efficiently assess reactance has abandoned the thought-
listing approach entirely, and instead has relied on semantic-differential scales to assess 
participants’ negative cognitions (e.g., Gardner & Leshner, 2016; Miller et al., 2007; Silvia, 




narrative and other-referencing messages in diabetes self-care education, the authors utilized a 
three-item measure developed from Silvia (2006) to assess negative cognitions (e.g., “Did you 
criticize the message you just saw while you were reading it?”). Other work, including Varava 
and Quick’s (2015) examination of adolescents’ movie choices, has utilized a two-item scale 
(e.g., “My thoughts about this movie rating are…” [1 = negative] to [7 = positive]). The 
advantage of this technique for assessing negative cognitions is of course, economy of 
measurement, and the flexibility to implement these measures outside the laboratory (e.g., Quick 
et al., 2015), in more longitudinal studies (e.g., Gardner & Leshner, 2016), and among non-
college student populations (e.g., Varava & Quick, 2015). However, focused research has yet to 
systematically evaluate if the use of semantic-differential scales provides as equally as valid of 
an assessment of negative cognitions as does the thought-listing technique. 
Modeling the Reactance Process 
As Brehm (1966) states that psychological reactance is triggered following exposure to a 
threatened or eliminated freedom, implicit in this definition is the idea of reactance as a two-step 
process. Thus, PRT researchers have advocated for modeling reactance as a two-step process 
featuring a freedom threat followed by reactance (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2008). The rationale for explicitly modeling freedom threat is that individuals may 
express anger and negative cognitions for any number of reasons unrelated to having their 
freedom threatened or eliminated (e.g., non-credible sources, grammatical errors, fallacious 
reasoning, unattractive font choice, etc.). Therefore, in order to fully test the reactance process, 
Quick and his colleagues (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2008) recommend 
modeling freedom threat as an induction check, followed by reactance. The most commonly used 




make a decision for me”). This measure of freedom threat has been shown to be both reliable and 
valid across various contexts (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick et al., 2015; Quick & Kim, 2009; 
Quick & Stephenson, 2008). 
Summary 
 Despite the clarity of Brehm’s (1966) description of reactance, as well as the frequent 
attention given to PRT among psychologists in the second half of the 20th century (Miron & 
Brehm, 2006), attempts at measuring reactance remained understudied until the early 2000’s. 
Consequently, for many years, researchers studying reactance adopted a black box approach to 
the central, defining construct of the theory. Recent advances, however, have demonstrated that 
reactance can be measured as a latent construct comprised of anger and negative cognitions 
(Dillard & Shen, 2005; Rains, 2013), and that reactance is best modeled as a two-step process 
with freedom threat preceding reactance (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2008). 
These advances in the reactance modeling process have allowed researchers to more directly 
examine reactance as originally predicted by the theorists themselves (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981). Consequently, contemporary scholars studying reactance have continued to 
develop our understanding of reactance as a process, as well as the audience characteristics and 
message features most likely to stimulate and diminish reactance.  
Contemporary Reactance Research 
 The history of PRT research can be summarized as following three distinct waves 
(Burgoon et al., 2002). In the first wave, spanning from 1966 to 1981, scholars primarily focused 
on fine-tuning the major components and propositional logic of PRT (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974; Wicklund & Brehm, 1968). Following this, during the second 




range of topics including consumer behavior (Brehm, 1989; Ringold, 1988), compliance-gaining 
and persuasion (Bensley & Wu, 1991; Goldman, Pulcher, & Mendez, 1983; Reich & Robertson, 
1979), interpersonal relationships (Hockenberry & Billingham, 1993; Manikowske & Winakor, 
1994; Wright & Brehm, 1982; Wright, Wadley, Danner, & Phillips, 1992), and clinical 
applications (Chamberlain, Patterson, Reid, Kavanagh, & Forgatch, 1984; Dowd & Sanders, 
1994; Dowd et al., 1994; Fogarty, 1997; Seibel & Dowd, 1999). In the third and current wave of 
reactance research, following the spirited review of PRT by Burgoon and colleagues (2002), 
reinvigorated interest in the theory led communication scholars to propose and test models of the 
reactance process (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & Stephenson, 2007a). Modern PRT 
research, particularly within the field of communication, primarily focuses on examining specific 
message features and audience characteristics that are associated with reactance (see Quick et al., 
2013). In this section, attention will be paid to contemporary communication research utilizing a 
PRT framework, including message features most likely to galvanize or mitigate reactance. 
Forceful Language 
One of the most testable propositions stemming from PRT is that persuasive messages 
using language that more explicitly attempts to limit one’s autonomy will elicit greater freedom 
threat (Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Though a litany of terms has been used in the literature to 
describe forceful language, including “controlling language” (Miller et al., 2007, p. 222), 
“dogmatic language” (Quick & Stephenson, 2008, p. 450), “domineering language,” (Quick et al., 
2015, p. 44), and “forceful language” (Quick & Considine, 2008, p. 483), replete in these 
experimental manipulations of forceful language are such phrases as “you must,” “it is 
impossible to deny,” and “stop the denial” (see Rains, 2013, Table 1, pp. 54-57). Forceful 




persuasive messages are clear and direct in the meaning being conveyed, leaving the receiver 
with little room for interpretation. Implicit messages, by contrast, are less direct and can often 
convey multiple meanings or interpretations (Miller et al., 2007). Though at times individuals 
certainly appreciate plain, direct talk due to its frankness (Dillard, Kinney, & Cruz, 1996), more 
explicit persuasive messages by their very nature are more freedom threatening (Miller, 2015). 
The ineffectiveness of more forceful language use in persuasive appeals has been well 
documented across various health contexts including alcohol consumption (Rains & Turner, 
2007), drug use (Miller et al., 2007), exercise (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 
2008), meningitis (Rains & Turner, 2007), sunscreen usage (Quick & Stephenson, 2008), strep 
throat (Rains & Turner, 2007), and tobacco use (Grandpre et al., 2003). Furthermore, these 
findings have been observed across various demographics, including adolescents (Quick & Kim, 
2009; Varava & Quick, 2015), college students (Miller et al., 2007; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), 
and adults (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick et al., 2015). 
One example of the ineffectiveness of freedom-restricting language use in persuasive 
appeals comes from Quick and Kim (2009), who examined reactance among a sample of South 
Korean adolescents. In their study, the authors experimentally manipulated the explicitness of a 
message promoting the TMX-890 camera phone by including such controlling phrases as, “It is 
impossible to deny,” “any reasonable person absolutely has to agree,” “No other conclusion 
makes sense,” “Stop the denial,” and “You simply have to do it” (p. 778). In contrast, the 
implicit message condition was experimentally manipulated to include such non-controlling 
phrases as, “It is difficult to deny,” “most customers agree,” “Purchasing the TMX-890 makes 
sense,” “consider buying it now,” and “Why not give it a try?” (p. 779). Consistent with their 




with greater freedom threat among South Korean adolescents. Consequently, freedom threat was 
associated with greater arousal of reactance, which was associated with a host of boomerang 
effects.  
The consistent findings of the various studies investigating PRT point to an underlying 
tension that exists for scholars and campaign designers attempting to create effective persuasive 
appeals. On one hand, messages with the objective of behavior change or reinforcement must by 
necessity be clear in advocating for a specific recommended action. Though explicit persuasive 
messages are likely to be more readily understood by the target audience, they are also more 
likely to provoke reactance due to being inherently freedom threatening in nature. Thus, a 
pervasive challenge for health campaigns is balancing the need to be direct in advocating for 
desired behaviors while simultaneously avoiding language that may, either explicitly or 
implicitly, threaten an audience member’s freedom to choose their course of action. In 
attempting to circumvent the negative effects of reactance, while still maintaining clear 
persuasive messages, researchers have investigated a variety of strategies for circumventing 
reactance arousal in the context of promotional health messages. These message strategies 
include the use of restoration postscripts (Bessarabova et al., 2013; Miller et al., 2007), provision 
of choice (Reynolds-Tylus et al., 2018; Shen, 2015), narratives (Gardner & Leshner, 2016; 
Moyer-Gusé & Nabi, 2010), empathetic language (Shen, 2010, 2011), gain-framed messages 
(Cho & Sands, 2011; Reinhart et al., 2007), novelty (Quick, 2013; Xu, 2015), other-referencing 








In the 50 years since Brehm (1966) first articulated his theory of psychological reactance, 
it is clear that PRT has advanced our understanding of persuasion and resistance in a multitude of 
ways. The fact that PRT still inspires questions and motivates research today is a testament to the 
heuristic power of the theory. Following the development of empirically validated methods for 
measuring and modeling psychological reactance (e.g., Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2007a), scholars continue to build on our understanding of the message features and 
audience characteristics associated with reactance. The current dissertation contributes to our 
understanding of PRT by examining two additional message features (descriptive and injunctive 
norms) as antecedents to reactance, as well as examining the role of message elaboration on the 




CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
For communication scholars interested in promoting healthy behaviors, the arousal of 
psychological reactance among message recipients is primarily an undesirable outcome 
(Burgoon et al., 2002; Quick et al., 2013). Given the motivational force of psychological 
reactance towards the reestablishment of threatened or lost freedoms (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & 
Brehm, 1981), scholars have been primarily interested in identifying the message features most 
likely to enhance or diminish reactance. In this spirit, researchers have identified a variety of 
message features known to elicit or inhibit reactance (see Quick et al., 2013 for a recent review). 
However, despite the many advances made by scholars in recent years, a continued 
understanding of theoretically derived message features will continue to add to our 
understanding of PRT (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Two theoretically derived 
message features of interest to the current study are descriptive and injunctive norms (Cialdini, 
Reno, & Kallgren, 1990; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Several theories of social influence account 
for the influence of descriptive and injunctive norms on behavior; including reasoned action 
theory (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010), the focus theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990), 
and the theory of normative social behavior (Rimal & Real, 2005). Despite this, no work to date 
has examined descriptive and injunctive norm messages as antecedents to psychological 
reactance. Before discussing the relationship between descriptive and injunctive norms messages 
and reactance, however, several key distinctions regarding the conceptualization of social norms 
relevant to the current discussion must briefly be discussed. 
Social Norms 
Social norms, at their most basic level, can be defined as socially negotiated and enforced 




et al., 1990; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). Social norms exist both at the level of a collective social 
entity, as well as at the individual level in the form of individuals’ perceptions (Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). Collective social norms represent a collective social 
entity’s code of conduct, whether it be a particular social network or an entire society. Collective 
social norms thus represent the prevailing social milieu within which individuals’ behaviors 
occur. Given, however, that collective social norms are seldom formally codified or explicitly 
stated, variability exists in individuals’ interpretations of collective social norms (Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005). Perceived social norms therefore represent each individual’s interpretation of a 
collective social norm (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). Given that perceived 
social norms, by definition, result from individuals’ cognitive and communicative processes, 
questions about the role of communication in normative influence are asked in the domain of 
perceived, rather than collective, social norms (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).  
Perceived social norms can be further delineated into perceived descriptive norms and 
perceived injunctive norms (Cialdini et al., 1990). Perceived descriptive norms refer to 
individuals’ perceptions of what is commonly done in a particular context by others (Cialdini et 
al., 1990). More simply, perceived descriptive norms can be thought of as individuals’ 
perceptions of the prevalence or popularity of a particular behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005). In 
contrast, perceived injunctive norms refer to individuals’ perceptions of what is commonly 
approved or disapproved of by others in a particular context (Cialdini et al., 1990; Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005). Perceived injunctive norms thus represent the social pressure that individuals feel 
to perform or not perform a particular behavior. Perceived descriptive norms are often referred to 
as the norm of the “is,” and perceived injunctive norms are often referred to as the norm of the 




Descriptive and injunctive norms can also be conceptualized as message features 
(Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). Specifically, a persuasive message can be 
said to include descriptive norm information if it includes information about the prevalence of a 
particular behavior among a specific referent group (e.g., “63% of [Michigan State University] 
students consume 5 or fewer drinks when they party,” Park, Smith, Klein, & Martell, 2011, pp. 
509-510). In turn, a persuasive message can be said to include injunctive norm information if it 
includes information about the social desirability (or undesirability) or a particular behavior 
among a specific referent group (e.g., “94% of [Michigan State University] students report they 
disapprove of drinking to the point of passing out,” Park et al., 2011, pp. 510). In the current 
investigation, the primary interest is the impact of descriptive and injunctive norms messages on 
reactance. The anticipated relationship descriptive norm messages and reactance is considered 
first, followed by the anticipated relationship between injunctive norm messages and reactance.  
Descriptive Norm Messages and Reactance 
Perceived descriptive norms are hypothesized to primarily influence individuals’ 
behavior by providing information about what is adaptive for a particular situation (Cialdini et al., 
1990; Reno, Cialdini, & Kallgren, 1993). For instance, a common finding in the alcohol 
prevention literature is that many college students overestimate their peers’ drinking behavior, 
and accordingly feel social pressure to conform to this norm (Borsari & Carey, 2003; Rimal & 
Real, 2003). Given the documented influence of perceived descriptive norms on behavior 
(Chung & Rimal, 2016), a common message strategy for behavior change – referred to as the 
social norms approach – is to target individuals’ perceived descriptive norms in order to 
encourage behavior change (Berkowitz, 2004; Perkins & Berkowitz, 1986). The underlying logic 




which others are engaging in risky health behaviors, a misconception commonly referred to as 
pluralistic ignorance (Prentice & Miller, 1996). Thus, by bringing individuals’ perceptions of the 
prevalence of a risky health behavior more in line with actual descriptive norms, this should 
motivate them to act in line with the newer (lower) level of risky health behavior.  
A commonly cited rationale in support of the social norms approach to behavior change 
is that descriptive norms messages are likely to minimize the arousal of reactance (Rimal, 2008; 
Wechsler et al., 2003). For instance, Rimal (2008) states that when promoting responsible 
drinking on college campuses, “[social norms] approaches are likely to minimize psychological 
reactance by establishing realistic norms around responsible consumption” (p. 115). To date, 
however, very little work has examined this claim empirically. Some researchers have reported 
data suggesting reactance like effects in response to descriptive norms messages (Campo et al., 
2004; Campo & Cameron, 2006). For instance, Campo and Cameron (2006) found that although 
light and moderate drinkers experienced a decrease in their positive attitude towards drinking 
following a descriptive norm message, heavy drinkers’ positive attitudes towards alcohol 
consumption actually increased. However, these aforementioned studies did not use a validated 
operationalization of reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005). A recent study by Reynolds-Tylus and 
colleagues (2018) was the first to examine the role of descriptive norm messages and reactance 
utilizing a validated operationalization of reactance. Their results revealed that energy and water 
conservation messages featuring a high descriptive norm (e.g., “Many Americans are conserving 
water…”) were no more freedom threatening than messages featuring a low descriptive norm 
(e.g., “Few Americans are conserving water…”). In addition, their results also demonstrated an 
indirect positive effect of a high descriptive norm message on intention, as mediated by 




message absent any descriptive norm information. Given that all persuasive messages hold the 
potential to be perceived as freedom threatening (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981), 
knowing whether the inclusion of descriptive norm information in a message arouses greater 
freedom threat than a control message holds both theoretical and practical purpose. As no work 
has explicitly examined this issue to date, the following research question is proposed, 
RQ1: Will a descriptive norm message be more or less freedom threatening than a 
control message? 
Injunctive Norm Messages and Reactance 
Perceived injunctive norms refer to individuals’ perceptions of what is commonly 
approved or disapproved of by others in a particular context (Cialdini et al., 1990; Lapinski & 
Rimal, 2005). Perceived injunctive norms thus represent the social pressure that individuals feel 
to perform or not perform a particular behavior. More specifically, perceived injunctive norms 
are thought to influence individuals’ behavior by conveying what “ought” to be done in a 
particular situation, and serve to illuminate underlining values that individuals’ perceive to be 
held by others in their social group (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Rimal & Real, 2005). Therefore, as 
opposed to descriptive norms, which typically do not involve social sanctions, injunctive norms 
are generally accompanied by social sanctions for noncompliance, or social approval for 
compliance (Bendor & Swistak, 2001; Lapinski & Rimal, 2005).  
Regrettably, the bulk of the experimental work on individuals’ responses to social norm 
messages has predominantly focused on manipulations of descriptive norms (Glazer, Smith, 
Atkin, & Hamel, 2010; Lapinski, Rimal, DeVries, & Lee, 2007; Rimal, 2008). This is limiting, 
as a better understanding of how individuals respond to injunctive norm messages holds 




experimental investigation of injunctive norm messages limits our broader understanding of how 
normative influence operates. From a practical standpoint, a reliance solely on manipulating 
descriptive norms unnecessarily limits the range of behaviors that campaign designers can target. 
More specifically, the provision of an accurate descriptive norm in a persuasive message is only 
possible in situations where the majority of audience members are already engaging in the 
desired outcome. Unfortunately, it is the case for many critical health issues (e.g., flu prevention) 
that simply not enough people engage in the recommended action (e.g., getting a flu shot; 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2017) to advertise a reasonably high 
descriptive norm. Therefore, in situations where a desired behavior occurs with too low of a 
frequency to accurately advertise a high descriptive norm, but there is high social approval or 
disapproval of the behavior (i.e., high injunctive norm), an alternative strategy is to emphasize 
injunctive norms in campaign messages. Indeed, recent work in applied settings (Cialdini et al., 
2006; Lawrence, 2015) has shown that highlighting injunctive norms can be an efficient strategy 
for behavior change when the encouraged behavior has broad approval (i.e., high injunctive 
norm), yet occurs with low frequency (i.e., low descriptive norm). 
A major potential limiting factor of injunctive norm messages, however, is the possibility 
that these messages will arouse psychological reactance. As perceived injunctive norms 
influence individuals’ behavior through explicit pressure to conform in the form of social 
sanctions (Cialdini et al., 1990: Cialdini & Trost, 1998), it is likely that an injunctive norm 
message may represent a more explicit freedom threat than a descriptive norm message. 
Although there is some indirect evidence to suggest that injunctive norm messages lead to 
reactance like effects (Stok, Ridder, Vet, & Wit, 2014), to date no work has directly examined 




reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005) or via the recommended two-step approach (Quick & 
Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2008). Therefore, considering the potential promises and 
pitfalls of injunctive norm messages for behavior change, the current investigation seeks to 
answer two critical questions in regards to the nature of injunctive norm messages and reactance. 
First, are persuasive messages emphasizing an injunctive norm more or less freedom threatening 
than a persuasive message emphasizing a descriptive norm? Second, is an injunctive norm 
message more or less freedom threatening than a control message absent any injunctive norm 
information? With these questions in mind, the following hypothesis and research question are 
offered: 
H1: An injunctive norm message will lead to greater freedom threat than a descriptive 
norm message. 
RQ2: Will an injunctive norm message be more or less freedom threatening than a 
control message? 
Forceful Language and Reactance 
PRT is based on the foundational assumption that individuals value their ability to make 
their own decisions (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). Therefore, a testable preposition of 
PRT is that a persuasive message that uses forceful, choice-restricting language will elicit greater 
freedom threat than message using less forceful, choice-enhancing language (Quick et al., 2013; 
Rains, 2013). In support of this, a large body of work has demonstrated that the use of more 
forceful language in a persuasive message enhances freedom threat (Dillard & Shen, 2005; 
Quick & Considine, 2008; Rains & Turner, 2007); whereas the use of less forceful language 





H2: The use of more forceful language in a persuasive message will elicit greater 
freedom threat than a message featuring less forceful language. 
Message Elaboration and Reactance 
Petty and Cacioppo’s (1986) elaboration likelihood model (ELM) provides a framework 
for understanding how message processing can affect persuasive outcomes. The ELM is a dual 
process approach to social information-processing (see Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014) 
developed to better understand the persuasion process. An alternative dual process theory of 
persuasion is the heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999). 
Though the HSM and ELM differ in important ways, both theories share the broad idea that 
persuasion can be achieved under conditions of both high and low effortful thought (O’Keefe, 
2013). The central premise of the ELM is that there are two primary ways in which persuasion 
can occur that are dependent on the degree of elaboration – or issue-relevant thinking – an 
individual engages in while processing a message (O’Keefe, 2013). In some situations, 
individuals engage in a great deal of issue-relevant thinking in response to a message. For 
instance, they may consider the message’s arguments and evidence carefully, reflect on similar 
arguments they recall, or consider other information they know about the topic. The ELM refers 
to this as central route processing, and persuasion occurring via this method is achieved through 
a careful consideration of the message’s arguments (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 
1999). In other situations, however, individuals engage in relatively low levels of issue-relevant 
thinking about a message. The ELM refers to this as peripheral route processing, and persuasion 
via this method typically results from individuals’ reliance on heuristics (e.g., “I should trust a 




Chaiken, 1980) rather than a thoughtful consideration of the message’s arguments (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999).  
Though the ELM specifies that persuasion can occur through either route, persuasion 
occurring via central route processing (i.e., high elaboration) is typically preferred as the 
persuasive effects resulting from this route tend to be more enduring over time, more resistant to 
counter persuasion, and more predictive of future behavior (O’Keefe, 2013). To date, however, 
the relationship between message elaboration and psychological reactance has yet to be 
examined. A central premise of the ELM is that under high levels of elaboration and the presence 
of strong arguments, favorable thoughts will dominate, and the likelihood of persuasion is 
enhanced (Carpenter, 2015; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). It may also be the case that when high 
elaboration results in an increased number of favorable thoughts about the message, 
psychological reactance is less likely to occur. That is, when individuals closely consider the 
arguments in a persuasive message with strong arguments, more favorable thoughts will result 
and accordingly the message will be viewed as less freedom threatening.  
H3: Greater message elaboration will be associated with diminished freedom threat. 
Considering message elaboration as a moderating variable of the reactance process may 
also be useful, as a key insight from the ELM literature is that the same message feature may 
function in different ways depending on the type of message processing that occurs (O’Keefe, 
2013). In respect to the role of language, given that a low level of message elaboration is 
characterized by a lack of careful attention to arguments and a greater reliance on heuristic cues, 
exposure to high forceful language (i.e., choice-restricting) under conditions of low message 
elaboration is likely to arouse greater freedom threat. In contrast, when individuals engage in a 




forceful language (i.e., choice-enhancing) will be less likely to arouse freedom threat, and 
consequently reactance. Therefore, 
 H4: Message elaboration and forceful language will interact such that when message 
elaboration is low, and forceful language is present, individuals will experience the 
greatest level of freedom threat.  
Modeling the Reactance Process 
The above mentioned hypotheses have focused on the role of antecedents to freedom 
threat. However, freedom threat is only the first step of the reactance process. As Brehm (1966) 
states that psychological reactance is triggered following exposure to the threatened or 
eliminated established freedom, consistent with this conceptualization, researchers have modeled 
reactance as a two-step process by demonstrating a positive association between freedom threat 
and reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005; LaVoie et al., 2017; Quick, 2012; Quick & Considine, 
2008; Quick et al., 2015; Quick & Stephenson, 2008). Empirical research has supported this 
conceptualization consistently and across various topics as evidenced by a recent meta-analysis 
(Rains, 2013). Therefore, 
H5: Freedom threat will be positively associated with psychological reactance.  
 Finally, as a large body of research has consistently demonstrated psychological 
reactance is associated with decreased attitudes (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick, 2012; Quick et al., 
2015; Shen, 2010, 2011, 2015) and intentions (Rains & Turner, 2007; Quick & Kim, 2009) 
toward the advocated behavior, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
 H6: Psychological reactance will be negatively associated with favorable attitude 




H7: Favorable attitude towards the recommended response will be positively associated 
with intention to adopt the recommended response. 
RQ1, RQ2, and H2-H7 are represented below in Figure 1. 
 
 




CHAPTER 4: STUDY 1 
Study 1 seeks to test H1-H7, and RQ1-2. The design for this study is a 3 (norms message: 
descriptive norm vs. injunctive norm vs. control) X 2 (forceful language: high vs. low) X 2 
(topic: alcohol consumption, regular exercise) between-subjects posttest only control group 
design. A posttest only design was used in order to avoid pretest measurement from sensitizing 
participants to the study topic, thus impacting their posttest scores (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 
2002). Participants were recruited from undergraduate communication courses and were 
randomly assigned to view one of twelve experimental messages. 
Method 
Procedures 
Students (N = 405) from introductory communication classes at a large Midwestern 
university were recruited to complete an online study on “perceptions of health messages.” 
Students were offered a small amount of extra credit for participating. All data was collected 
online via Qualtrics. Following an initial informed consent page, an automated algorithm 
randomly assigned participants to one of twelve message conditions. Participants were presented 
with a single print message, and were instructed to read the message carefully and in its entirety. 
Immediately following exposure to the print message, participants completed a thought-listing 
task for 90 seconds (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Following the thought-listing procedure, 
participants completed a variety of posttest measures relevant to the health topic and a 
demographic questionnaire.  
Data Screening 
Several steps were taken to ensure the integrity of the data. The initial sample was 




procedure (n = 21), or who failed a single attention check item3 (n = 28) were removed from 
final analysis. In addition, participants who spent too little time on the survey (< 5 minutes; 
“careless respondents,” n = 3) and those who spent too long on the survey (> 60 minutes; 
“distracted respondents,” n = 30) were removed from final analyses (see Zhou & Niederdeppe, 
2017 for a similar method). This resulted in a final sample of 323 participants. The remaining 
participants spent an average of 19.00 minutes (SD = 9.48) completing the survey. 
Participants 
Participants (n = 323) ranged in age from 18 to 27 (M = 20.34, SD = 1.38). The majority 
of participants were female (67.8%). Most participants reported their race/ethnicity4 as White or 
Caucasian (63.2%), followed by Asian (17.0%), Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish origin (12.7%), and 
African American or Black (10.2%). The remaining participants (2.2%) reported some other 
racial or ethnic background. Participants were evenly split by educational achievement 
(Freshman [19.8%], Sophomore [26.6%], Junior [29.4%], and Senior [24.1%]). Slightly less than 
half of participants (47.2%) reported being affiliated with Greek Life, and very few (4.0%) 
participants were members of a collegiate sports team. The distribution of demographic variables 
did not differ across experimental conditions. For participants in the alcohol condition (n = 163), 
participants reported drinking an average of 4.77 drinks (SD = 3.77) the last time they 
“partied/socialized,” and an average of 7.56 drinks (SD = 9.16) per week. The average age 
participants reported consuming their first alcoholic drink was 16.14 (SD = 2.49), and the 
average age in which participants first reported purchasing alcohol was 19.17 (SD = 1.88). 
Approximately 8% of participants reported never consuming alcohol, and 35% of participants 
                                               
3 A 5-point Likert scale asked participants “How much attention did you pay while you filled out the survey?” (1 = 
very little attention to 5 = very close attention). Participants who reported an answer below the midpoint (i.e., “very 
little attention” or “little attention”) were removed from further analyses. 




reported never purchasing alcohol. For participants in the exercise condition (n = 160), slightly 
more than half (55.2%) reported having a gym membership, and reported exercising for an 
average of 4.49 (SD = 4.36) hours per week. 
Message Stimuli 
Health information in all messages was adapted from various sites including the CDC 
(2012, 2015), National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (2015), and the American 
College Health Association (2015). Two topics (alcohol consumption and exercise) were chosen 
for the current investigation, considering the importance and relevance of these topics among a 
college-aged population (CDC, 2012, 2015; Hingson, Zha, & Weitzman, 2009). For each topic, 
six messages were developed using a 3 (norms message: descriptive norm vs. injunctive norm vs. 
control) X 2 (forceful language: high vs. low) design, resulting in a total of twelve experimental 
messages. See Appendix A for full text of each message condition. 
Following guidelines from communication scholars (Brashers & Jackson, 1999; Jackson, 
1992; Jackson, O’Keefe, Jacobs, & Brashers, 1989; O’Keefe, 2015; Slater, Peter, & Valkenburg, 
2015), two broad considerations guided the construction of messages for Study 1. First, based on 
the recommendation that researchers do their best to have experimental messages model 
naturally occurring examples of the message type (Brashers & Jackson, 1999; Slater et al., 2015), 
message manipulations were constructed to be as prototypical of the superordinate message 
category as possible. In doing so, social norms messages were kept intentionally short, and the 
wording of messages modeled that of previous social norms campaigns (Perkins, 2003; Perkins 
& Berkowitz, 1986). Second, multiple health topics were used to provide a more rigorous test of 
the message features of interest (Grabe & Westley, 2003; O’Keefe, 2015). Experimental 




Alcohol consumption. Alcohol consumption was chosen as an appropriate topic 
considering the prevalence of dangerous patterns of alcohol consumption among college students 
in the United States (CDC, 2012; Hingson et al., 2009). According to the Substance Abuse and 
Mental Health Services Administration (2015), approximately 38% of young adults aged 18 to 
25 reported engaging in at least one episode of heavy drinking within the past month. The 
consequences of frequent and excessive intoxication are numerous, ranging from academic 
problems such as missed class and poor grades, to more serious problems including drunk 
driving, personal injury, sexual assault, and even death (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and 
Alcoholism, 2015). Furthermore, excessive alcohol consumption is related to suicidal ideation 
and behaviors (Schaffer, Jeglic, & Stanley, 2008), and excessive alcohol use at younger ages 
predicts alcohol abuse later in life (Sloan, Grossman, & Platt, 2011).  
All alcohol messages begin with a kernel message, adapted from the CDC (2012) and 
National Institute of Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism (2015), that stated, “Excessive alcohol 
consumption can pose serious risks to your health and physical safety, and over time can increase 
your risk for many chronic diseases.” The descriptive norm condition included information about 
the prevalence of college student drinking adapted from unpublished data from the University of 
Illinois Core Alcohol and Drug Survey (2016), “Most Illini drink moderately. According to a 
recent survey of University of Illinois students, 71% reported drinking 4 or fewer drinks the last 
time they partied.” Correspondingly, the injunctive norm condition stated, “Most Illini think you 
should drink moderately. According to a recent survey of University of Illinois students, 71% 
strongly agree that other students should limit the number of drinks when they party to 4 or 
fewer.” The decision to include identical statistical information in both the descriptive and 




providing different percentages for descriptive and injunctive norms messages. The control 
condition contained no normative information about the prevalence of drinking among university 
students. 
The forceful language manipulation was included at the end of the alcohol message. In 
the high forceful language condition, the message concluded by saying, “If you drink, you must 
drink responsibly. You simply have to do it!” For the low forceful language condition, the 
message concluded by stating, “If you drink, consider drinking responsibly. The choice is up to 
you!” Alcohol related messages ranged in length from 38 to 73 words in total.  
Exercise. Regular exercise was chosen as an appropriate topic considering the benefits of 
regular physical activity for the prevention of chronic diseases (e.g., cardiovascular disease, 
diabetes, cancer) and premature death (Warburton, Nicol, & Bredin, 2006). Recent data shows 
that approximately one third of American adults, and 17.2% of American youth, are overweight 
or obese (Ogden, Carroll, Fryar, & Flegal, 2015). Obesity is directly related to a number of 
health conditions, including type II diabetes, heart disease, and hypertension, which are some of 
the most prominent contributors to mortality in the United States (Mokdad et al., 2004). Recent 
evidence suggests that college may be a critically important developmental window for 
development or reinforcement of positive physical activity and weight management practices 
(Lloyd-Richardson, Bailey, Fava, & Wing, 2009).  
 All exercise messages began with a kernel message, adapted from the CDC (2015), 
which stated, “Regular exercise can provide important benefits to your overall health and fitness, 
and over time can reduce your risk for many chronic diseases.” The descriptive norm condition 
included information about the prevalence of regular exercise on the University of Illinois 




exercise regularly. According to a recent survey of University of Illinois students, 65% reported 
exercising for 3 or more hours per week.” Correspondingly, the injunctive norm condition stated, 
“Most Illini think you should exercise regularly. According to a recent survey of University of 
Illinois students, 65% strongly agree that other students should exercise for 3 or more hours per 
week.” As in the alcohol messages, statistical information was kept the same across both the 
descriptive and injunctive norms conditions in order to avoid a potential confound. The control 
condition included no normative information about the prevalence of regular exercise on campus. 
Forceful language for the exercise messages was manipulated in a similar manner to the 
alcohol message. In the high forceful language condition, the message finished by stating, “You 
must exercise regularly. You simply have to do it!” For the low forceful language condition, the 
message concluded with statement, “Consider exercising regularly. The choice is up to you!” 
Exercise messages ranged in length from 34 to 65 words in total. 
Measures 
Unless otherwise noted, all items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree to 5 = strongly agree). See Tables 1 and 2 for a correlation matrix, means, and standard 
deviations for all variables from the alcohol and exercise samples. See Appendix B for all Study 
1 measures. 
 Psychological reactance. Considerable research has demonstrated that reactance is best 
operationalized as a latent construct comprised of anger and negative cognitions (Dillard & Shen, 
2005; Quick, 2012; Rains, 2013). Following previous work (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2008), anger was assessed with four items (irritated, angry, annoyed, aggravated) 
prefaced by the stem, “How did you feel while viewing this message?” The anger scale had good 




studies (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), negative cognitions were assessed 
via the thought-listing technique (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). After viewing the message, 
participants were told to take 90 seconds to write down all of the thoughts that passed through 
their mind while they viewed the message. Participants were asked to write one thought per box, 
and to not worry about spelling, punctuation, or writing in complete sentences. Fifteen boxes 
were provided in Qualtrics for participants to indicate their thoughts. After 90 seconds, Qualtrics 
allowed participants to advance to the next screen. After listing their thoughts, participants were 
given instructions to code each thought they listed for both relevance and valence (Quick & 
Stephenson, 2008; Rains & Turner, 2007). For relevance, participants were asked to indicate 
whether or not the thought was relevant (about the message) or irrelevant (not about the 
message). For valence, participants were asked to indicate whether or not the thought was 
favorable (e.g., a positive thought about the message), unfavorable (e.g., a negative thought 
about the message), or neutral (i.e., neither favorable nor unfavorable). Participants completed 
this procedure for each thought listed. For subsequent analysis, only the relevant negative 
thoughts were summed to create a scale of the total number of negative cognitions each 
participant had while viewing the message. Participants who viewed the alcohol message 
reported an average of 1.4 negative cognitions (SD = 1.78), whereas participants exposed to the 
exercise message reported an average of 0.92 negative cognitions (SD = 1.45). 
 Freedom threat. In order for reactance to occur, an individual must first perceive that his 
or her established freedom has been threatened or eliminated (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 
1981). Therefore, communication scholars have recommended modeling reactance as a two-step 
process, with freedom threat serving as a manipulation check and as an antecedent to reactance 




was measured with four items (e.g., “The message threatened my freedom”) from Dillard and 
Shen (2005). This scale demonstrated acceptable reliability across both the alcohol (α = .83) and 
exercise (α = .90) samples. 
 Perceived descriptive norm. Perceived descriptive norm was measured with three items 
(e.g., “Most University of Illinois students [limit their alcohol consumption to 4 drinks or fewer 
when they party/make sure to exercise for at least 3 hours per week]”) adapted from Park, Klein, 
Smith, and Martell (2009). This scale had acceptable reliability across both the alcohol (α = .86) 
and exercise (α = .93) samples. 
 Perceived injunctive norm. Perceived injunctive norm was assessed with three items 
(e.g., “Most University of Illinois students would approve of [my limiting my alcohol 
consumption 4 drinks or fewer when I party/me exercising for 3 or more hours per week]”) 
adapted from Park and colleagues (2009). This scale demonstrated acceptable reliability across 
both the alcohol (α = .78) and exercise (α = .88) samples. 
 Message elaboration. Message elaboration was measured with four items (e.g., “Overall, 
how much did the message make you think about [moderating your drinking/exercising 
regularly]?”) adapted from Stephenson & Palmgreen (2001). The scale had acceptable reliability 
for both the alcohol (α = .85) and exercise (α = .89) samples. 
 Attitude. Attitude was measured with four items (e.g., “[Limiting my drinking to 4 
drinks or less when I party/Exercising for at least 3 hours per week] is a good thing for me to 
do”) based on Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). This scale had excellent reliability across both the 
alcohol (α = .91) and exercise (α = .95) samples. 
 Behavioral intention. Behavioral intention was measured with three items (e.g., “In the 




hours per week]) based on Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). This scale demonstrated excellent 
reliability across both the alcohol (α = .94) and exercise (α = .94) samples. 
Results 
Prior to analysis, data was screened to ensure all assumptions for multivariate normality 
were met (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Less than 1% of all data were missing (41 of 8,398 cells 
used for analysis = 0.49% missing), which falls well below the problematic 5% threshold for 
missing data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Furthermore, missing data were screened and found to 
be missing completely at random (MCaR). Values for skewness and kurtosis were within normal 
ranges (-2 to +2) for all variables with the exception of anger and negative cognitions. In the 
alcohol sample, negative cognitions were both skewed (2.30) and kurtotic (8.49). In the exercise 
sample, negative cognitions were both skewed (2.29) and kurtotic (6.56), and anger was kurtotic 
(3.46). Furthermore, data met the assumptions of homoscedascticity and homogeneity of 
variance. Finally, multicollinearity was not an issue, as all bivariate correlations between scales 
were modest (well below .90; see Tables 1 and 2). Therefore, data for both the alcohol and 
exercise samples met most of the assumptions for multivariate normality.  
Induction Checks 
Prior to conducting induction checks, potential covariates were examined. There were no 
significant bivariate correlations between freedom threat and any covariates examined for both 
the alcohol (age, biological sex, year in school, Greek status, age of first drink, age of first 
alcohol purchase, and collegiate sports team membership, p > .05) and exercise samples (age, 
biological sex, collegiate sports team membership, gym membership, and average hours of 
exercise per week, p > .05). Thus, no covariates were controlled for in the induction checks or 




participants perceived differences between the various message conditions. To examine the main 
effects of the freedom threat manipulation, an independent samples t-test was conducted for both 
topics. Message condition (low forceful language vs. high forceful language) served as the 
independent variable and freedom threat served as the dependent variable. For the alcohol 
sample, participants in the high forceful language condition reported a higher freedom threat (M 
= 3.19, SD = 0.95) than those in the low forceful language condition (M = 2.46, SD = 0.70), t(1, 
156) = -5.41, p < .001. Likewise, for the exercise sample, participants in the high forceful 
language condition reported higher freedom threat (M = 2.97, SD = 0.94) than those in the low 
forceful language condition (M = 2.25, SD = 0.84), t(1, 160) = -5.17, p < .001. Thus, the forceful 
language manipulation was successful across both topics. 
To examine the main effects of the norm manipulation, a series of factorial ANOVAs 
were conducted. Message condition (descriptive vs. injunctive vs. control) served as the 
independent variable and perceived descriptive and injunctive norms served as the dependent 
variables. Across all three conditions, participants did not differ in their perceived descriptive 
norms for both the alcohol, F(2, 158) = 0.93, p > .05, and exercise samples, F(2, 158) = 2.97, p 
> .05. Likewise, across all three norm conditions, participants did not differ in their perceived 
injunctive norms for both the alcohol, F(2, 158) = 0.02, p > .05, and exercise samples, F(2, 160) 
= 0.61, p > .05. In sum, the descriptive and injunctive norm message manipulations5 were 
unsuccessful at influencing perceived norms across both topics. 
RQ1 and RQ2 sought to determine if the inclusion of descriptive (RQ1) and injunctive 
norms (RQ2) information in a persuasive message elicited greater freedom threat than a control 
message absent any social norms information. H1 proposed that an injunctive norm message 
                                               
5 Of note, participants did not differ in freedom threat across all three norm conditions in both the alcohol, F(2, 158) 




would elicit greater freedom threat than a descriptive norm message. However, given that the 
descriptive and injunctive norm message manipulations were unsuccessful in influencing 
perceived norms, RQ1, RQ2, and H1 were unable to be satisfactorily examined. Therefore, in 
lieu of examining message features in the structural model, perceived descriptive and injunctive 
norms were instead included as exogenous variables preceding freedom threat. Consequently, the 
following research questions were proposed, 
RQ3: Is there an association between perceived descriptive norm and freedom threat? 
RQ4: Is there an association between perceived injunctive norm and freedom threat? 
See Figure 2 for the revised hypothesized structural model for Study 1. 
 
 
Figure 2. Revised Hypothesized Structural Model (Study 1). 
 
An assumption of H3 was that message arguments would be perceived as strong. In order 




participants completed a 4-item6 measure of perceived message effectiveness (Dillard, Shen, & 
Vail, 2007; α = .79 [alcohol], α = .86 [exercise]). The mean for perceived message effectiveness 
was significantly greater than the scale midpoint for both the alcohol (M = 3.16, SD = 0.72), t(1, 
157) = 2.75, p < .01, and exercise conditions (M = 3.52, SD = 0.72), t(1, 157) = 9.09, p < .001. 
Therefore, the assumption of strong arguments for H3 was met for both samples.  
Data Analytic Procedures 
H2-H7 and RQ3-RQ4 were evaluated with structural equation modeling using the 
maximum likelihood robust7 (MLR) estimator in Mplus 7.4 for Mac. Model fit was evaluated via 
four common fit indices (Kline, 2016): (a) model chi-square (χ²), (b) the standardized root mean 
squared residual (SRMR), the root-mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), and (d) the 
comparative fit index (CFI). The χ² statistic is overly sensitive to model misfit even with 
moderately small sample sizes, and thus the statistic is reported here as a base statistic along with 
other measures of model fit (Kline, 2016). Model fit was evaluated using established standards, 
with RMSEA ≤ .08, CFI ≥ .90, and SRMR ≤ .09 indicating “acceptable” model fit (Holbert & 
Stephenson, 2008), and RMSEA ≤ .06, CFI ≥.95, and SRMR ≤ .08 indicating “good” model fit 
(Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2016). Consistent with established procedures, the two-step analysis 
procedure was employed (Kline, 2016). Specifically, before testing the structural models, all 
latent variables were submitted to confirmatory factor analysis to assess satisfactory 
measurement of the latent constructs. 
 
 
                                               
6 A 5-point (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) Likert scale asked participants their agreement with 
following statements: (a) “The message was believable,” (b) “The message was compelling,” (c) “The message was 
convincing,” and (d) “The message was effective.” 
7 MLR corrects for non-normality in data. Preliminary analyses revealed that both anger and negative cognitions 




Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The hypothesized models contained seven latent variables each including: (a) freedom 
threat, (b) anger, (c) attitude, (d) perceived descriptive norm, (e) perceived injunctive norm, (f) 
message elaboration, and (g) behavioral intention. Negative cognitions were represented with a 
single item observed variable. Forceful language was modeled as an observed variable (0 = low 
forceful language, 1 = high forceful language). Overall, the measurement model demonstrated 
acceptable model fit for both the hypothesized alcohol model, χ² (254, n = 158) = 437.13, p < 
.001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .057, .078), CFI = .91, SRMR = .05, and exercise model, χ² (254, 
n = 163) = 435.81, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .056, .077), CFI = .93, SRMR = .05. 
Invariance Testing 
 Examination of measurement invariance for sample topic (alcohol vs. exercise) was 
conducted prior to the main analysis. Investigation of measurement invariance is done through a 
sequential process using multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis and is assessed by 
examining four increasingly constrained nested models (Dimitrov, 2010; Wu, Li, & Zumbo, 
2007). If invariance fails to hold at one of the steps, further examination is not necessary, and the 
groups are said to be invariant at the previous step. The approach begins with configural 
invariance, whereby all parameters are freely estimated across groups. This step determines 
whether the separate groups demonstrate equivalent factor structure, and thus comprise the same 
latent construct. In the next step, metric invariance is assessed by constraining factor loadings 
across groups to test the equivalence of the factor loadings across groups. Metric invariance 
ensures that the items are relating to the same underlying factor in a consistent manner. 
Following this, scalar invariance is examined by constraining equal intercepts across groups. 




similarly. Finally, and assuming the criteria for all previous steps have been met, residual 
invariance is examined by constraining residual variances to be equal. Support for residual 
invariance establishes that the same amount of error or variance unaccounted for by the factor is 
consistent for each item across groups. Evidence of invariance of parameters between nested 
models was based on non-significant χ² difference tests, along with change in CFI < .01 (Cheung 
& Rensvold, 2002), and change in RMSEA < .015 (Chen, 2007).  
Invariance testing began with an examination of configural invariance, whereby all 
parameters were freely estimated across groups in order to determine if the separate groups 
demonstrate equivalent factor structure, and thus comprise the same latent construct. The 
configural model demonstrated acceptable fit, χ² (526, N = 321) = 911.66, p < .001, RMSEA 
= .07 [90% CI = .060, .075), CFI = .92, SRMR = .06. In the next step, metric invariance was 
assessed by constraining factor loadings across groups to test the equivalence of the factor 
loadings across groups, ensuring the items are relating to the same underlying factor in a 
consistent manner. The metric invariance model did not demonstrate acceptable fit, χ² (551, N = 
321) = 1191.88, p < .001, RMSEA = .09 [90% CI = .079, .092], CFI = .86, SRMR = .21. 
Furthermore, the change in CFI was > .01, change in RMSEA was > .015, and the χ² difference 
test was significant (Satorra-Bentler Scaled χ² [df = 25] = 335.52, p < .001). Therefore, given the 
non-invariance of the sample topics, separate structural models were examined for each topic for 
the main analysis.  
Main Analysis 
The initial structural model for the alcohol sample demonstrated acceptable fit, χ² (243, n 
= 160) = 408.31, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .054, .076), CFI = .91, with the exception of 




norm to attitude. The addition of this path improved the fit of the alcohol structural model, χ² 
(242, n = 160) = 394.35, p < .001, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI = .051, .074), CFI = .92, SRMR = .08. 
Likewise, the initial structural model for the exercise sample also demonstrated acceptable fit, χ² 
(243, n = 163) = 440.32, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .060, .081), CFI = .91, with the 
exception of SRMR = .11. Modification indices suggested the addition of a path from message 
elaboration to reactance. The addition of this path improved the fit of the exercise structural 
model, χ² (242, n = 163) = 426.95, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .058, .079), CFI = .92, 
SRMR = .09. The unstandardized (UPC) and standardized (SPC) path coefficients for both 
models, alongside their statistical significance, are presented below. See Figures 3 and 4 for the 
final alcohol and exercise structural models.  
 
 
Figure 3. Final Structural Model for the Alcohol Sample. 
Note. Unstandardized estimates are listed first, followed by standardized estimates in parentheses. Solid lines 
represent a priori hypotheses and research questions; dashed lines indicate post hoc modifications of the structural 
model. Forceful language was coded such that 0 = low forceful language, 1 = high forceful language. For visual 
simplicity, the interaction between forceful language and message elaboration on freedom threat is not shown in the 
model (UPC = -.11, SPC = -.06, p > .05). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. χ² (242, n = 160) = 394.35, p < .001, 








Figure 4. Final Structural Model for the Exercise Sample. 
Note. Unstandardized estimates are listed first, followed by standardized estimates in parentheses. Solid lines 
represent a priori hypotheses and research questions; dashed lines indicate post hoc modifications of the structural 
model. Forceful language was coded such that 0 = low forceful language, 1 = high forceful language. For visual 
simplicity, the interaction between forceful language and message elaboration on freedom threat is not shown in the 
model (UPC = -.53, SPC = -.21, p < .05). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. χ² (242, n = 163) = 426.95, p < .001, 
RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .058, .079), CFI = .92, SRMR = .09. 
 
H2 predicted that forceful language would be associated with greater freedom threat. A 
statistically significant positive associated between forceful language and freedom threat was 
observed for the alcohol sample (UPC = .78/SPC = .46, p < .001) and exercise sample (UPC 
= .77/SPC = .39, p < .001). H3 predicted that greater message elaboration would diminish 
freedom threat. A statistically significant negative association was observed between message 
elaboration and freedom threat for the alcohol sample (UPC = -.16, SPC = -.18, p < .05) but not 
for the exercise sample (UPC = -.07, SPC = -.06, p > .05). H4 predicted an interaction between 
message elaboration and forceful language. No statistically significant interaction was observed 
in the alcohol sample (UPC = -.11, SPC = -.06, p > .05), but an interaction was found for the 
exercise sample (UPC = -.53, SPC = -.21, p < .05). Specifically, those participants who viewed a 




elaboration (+1SD) experienced the lowest level of freedom threat. See Figure 5 for a 
decomposition of the interaction. 
 
 
Figure 5. Interaction between Message Elaboration and Forceful Language on Freedom Threat 
for the Exercise Sample 
Note. Low message elaboration = -1SD, High message elaboration = +1SD. 
 
H5 predicted that freedom threat would be positively associated with reactance. As 
expected, statistically significant associations emerged between freedom threat and reactance for 
the alcohol sample (UPC = .37/SPC = .70, p < .001) and exercise sample (UPC = .27/SPC = .53, 
p < .001). H6 predicted that reactance would be negatively associated with attitude towards the 
recommended response. Consistent with this prediction, a statistically significant association was 
found between reactance and attitude for both the alcohol sample (UPC = -.37/SPC = -.23, p 
< .05) and the exercise sample (UPC = -.44/SPC = -.37, p < .001). In turn, H7 predicted that 




recommended response. As expected, the results revealed a statistically significant positive 
association between attitude and intention for both the alcohol sample (UPC = .96/SPC = .69, p 
< .001) and exercise sample (UPC = .75/SPC = .42, p < .001).  
RQ3 examined a potential relationship between perceived descriptive norm and freedom 
threat. No relationship was observed between perceived descriptive norm and freedom threat in 
both the alcohol sample (UPC = -.10/SPC = -.09, p > .05) and exercise sample (UPC = .04/SPC 
= .04, p > .05). RQ4 examined a potential relationship between perceived injunctive norm and 
freedom threat. Perceived injunctive norm was not significantly associated with freedom threat 
in both the alcohol sample (UPC = .17/SPC = .14, p > .05) and exercise sample (UPC = -.22/SPC 
= -.15, p > .05). 
Post Hoc Modifications 
 As mentioned above, the examination of modification indices following initial model 
misfit suggested the addition of a path from perceived injunctive norm to attitude for the alcohol 
sample, and a path from message elaboration to reactance for the exercise sample. Results 
indicated a positive relationship between perceived injunctive norm and attitude (UPC = .33, 
SPC = .31, p < .01) for the alcohol structural model. For the exercise model, results revealed a 
negative association between message elaboration and reactance (UPC = -.21, SPC = -.32, p 
< .001). No other post hoc modifications to the alcohol and exercise models were made.  
Indirect Effects and Variance Explained 
In addition to testing for the direct associations specified above, indirect associations 
were tested using RMediation software (Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011). RMediation computes 
95% confidence intervals for mediated effects. RMediation tests revealed that: (a) freedom threat 




0.125, -0.001), (b) freedom threat mediated the forceful language and reactance relationship for 
both the alcohol (95% CI = 0.163, 0.438) and exercise sample (95% CI = 0.105, 0.333), (c) 
reactance mediated the freedom threat and attitude relationship for both the alcohol (95% CI = -
0.290, -0.001) and exercise sample (95% CI = -0.194, -0.057), and (d) attitude mediated the 
reactance and intention relationship for both the alcohol (95% CI = -0.777, -0.001) and exercise 
sample (95% CI = -0.541, -0.158). For the alcohol sample, attitude mediated the perceived 
injunctive norm and intention relationship (95% CI = 0.098, 0.591). For the exercise sample, 
reactance mediated the message elaboration and attitude relationship (95% CI = 0.034, 0.167). 
No other indirect effects were found. In all, the structural models accounted for the following 
variance in the endogenous variables for the alcohol and exercise samples, respectively: freedom 
threat (R2 = .26 and .18), reactance (R2 = .48 and .41), attitude (R2 = .14 and .14), and intention 




CHAPTER 5: STUDY 2 
 Study 2 sought to address several limitations of Study 1. First, Study 2 sought to address 
the failure of the descriptive and injunctive norm message manipulations in Study 1 by 
examining two additional topics among a different population (American adult Internet users). 
Second, the norms information included in Study 2 messages were designed to be simpler and 
easier to understand, to avoid any potential issues with numeracy. More specifically, the norms 
information in Study 2 messages focused simply on the percent of American adults who reported 
engaging in (or supporting) a particular behavior (e.g., “70% of Americans have purchased 
energy-efficient light bulbs…”), rather than providing normative information with both a 
percentage (e.g., “71 of Illinois students…”) and the average number of hours an individual 
engages in behavior (“…exercise for 3 or more hours per week”). Third, Study 2 also includes a 
combined descriptive and injunctive norm message condition, thus allowing for a condition with 
a stronger norms induction, as well as the ability to examine a potential interactive effect of a 
combined descriptive and injunctive norm message on reactance. Finally, to ensure data quality, 
an additional attention check item8 was added to Study 2. 
Study Design & Procedures 
The design for Study 2 was a 2 (descriptive norm: present vs. absent) X 2 (injunctive 
norm: present vs. absent) X 2 (forceful language: high vs. low) X 2 (topic: organ donation, 
energy conservation) between-subjects posttest only design. Participants (N = 655) were 
recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), an online platform designed to compensate 
individuals for the completion of short tasks, including survey and experimental research. 
                                               
8 The attention check was a distractor question that purportedly asked participants about their mood. Embedded 
within the instructions, the question read, “…we are interested in whether you actually take the time to read the 
directions. To show that you took the time to read these instructions, please ignore the question below and instead 




Participants were eligible if they meet the following criteria: (a) 18 years of age or older, (b) U.S. 
citizens, and (c) have an MTurk rating9 of .80 or higher (to ensure the integrity of the data 
collected). 
Procedures for Study 2 were nearly identical to Study 1. All data was collected online via 
Qualtrics. After documenting their informed consent, an automated algorithm randomly assigned 
participants to one of sixteen message conditions. Participants viewed a single print message, 
and were informed to read the message carefully and in its entirety. Immediately following 
exposure to the print message, participants completed a thought-listing task for 90 seconds (Petty 
& Cacioppo, 1986). Following the thought-listing procedure, participants completed posttest 
measures relevant to the topic and a demographic questionnaire. 
Data Screening 
A total of 655 participants were recruited from MTurk. Several steps were taken to 
ensure the integrity of the data. First, participants who did not complete the thought listing 
procedure (n = 15), or who failed one of two attention check items10 (n = 97) were removed from 
final analysis. In addition, participants who spent too little time on the survey (< 5 minutes; 
“careless respondents,” n = 30) and those who spent too long on the survey (> 60 minutes; 
“distracted respondents,” n = 2) were removed from final analyses (Zhou & Niederdeppe, 2017). 
This resulted in a final sample of 512 participants. The remaining participants spent an average 
of 12.81 minutes (SD = 6.16) completing the survey. 
 
 
                                               
9 This means that only those MTurkers who have been confirmed to have successfully completed 80% or more of 
their assignments (as determined by the requesters) were able to see and complete the survey assignment.  
10 The first attention check item (n = 6 failed) was exactly the same as the one used in Study 1 (see footnote 3). The 





Participants (n = 512) ranged in age from 19 to 98 (M = 38.03, SD = 13.26). The majority 
of participants were female (66.6%). Most participants reported their race/ethnicity11 as White or 
Caucasian (79.5%), followed by African American or Black (7.8%), Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish 
origin (7.2%), Asian (4.7%), and American Indian or Alaskan Native (1.8%). The remaining 
participants (2.5%) reported some other racial or ethnic background. Participants were 
represented from every U.S. state and territory, though the largest number resided in Florida 
(7.8%), California (7.4%), Texas (6.4%) and New York (5.7%). Participants were well educated, 
with the majority of participants reporting either having a 2-year degree (Associate’s; 12.3%), a 
4-year degree (BA or BS; 39.1%), or a postgraduate/professional degree (14.6%). The remaining 
participants reported their highest education level as some college (24.6%), a High School 
Diploma/GED (9.0%), or some High School (0.4%). Participants were also well represented in 
terms of household income, with $50,000-74,999 (20.5%) and $35-49,999 (15.8%) being the 
most commonly reported categories for household income. The distribution of demographic 
variables did not differ across experimental conditions.  
Message Stimuli 
Two topics (energy conservation and organ donation) were chosen for Study 2, 
considering both are broadly relevant and applicable to an adult-aged population. For each topic, 
eight messages were developed using a 2 (descriptive norm: present vs. absent) X 2 (injunctive 
norm: present vs. absent) X 2 (forceful language: high vs. low) design, resulting in a total of 
sixteen experimental messages. See Appendix C for full text of each message condition. 
Experimental messages are specified in greater detail below. 
                                               




Organ donation. Organ donation was chosen as an appropriate topic for two primary 
reasons. First, understanding effective strategies for promoting organ donation registration rates 
is critical considering the large number of Americans currently waiting to receive a lifesaving 
organ transplant. Currently, over 118,000 people are on the national transplant waiting list 
waiting to receive a lifesaving or life-extending organ transplant (United Network for Organ 
Sharing [UNOS], 2017). Each year, approximately 6,500 people die due to a lack of available 
organs (Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network [OPTN], 2017). Second, organ 
donation provided an interesting topic area for investigating norms messages, as although the 
vast majority of Americans say they support organ donation (Gallup, 2013), only about half of 
Americans have formally documented their legal consent to organ donation in their state donor 
registry (Donate Life America, 2016). Therefore, the topic of organ donation allows for the 
examination of a topic whereby collective descriptive and injunctive norms are quite disparate.  
All organ donation messages begin with a kernel message, adapted from various sources 
(OPTN, 2017; UNOS, 2017), which stated, “More than 118,000 people in the United States are 
currently waiting for a lifesaving organ transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life 
and hope to many people. A single donor can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 
people.” The descriptive norm condition (present vs. absent) either included information about 
the prevalence of registration rates across the country taken from Donate Life America (2016), 
“To date, more than half of all Americans have signed up to become organ donors,” or provided 
no descriptive norm information. In contrast, the injunctive norm condition (prevent vs. absent) 
contained either information about Americans support towards organ donation taken from a 
recent Gallup (2013) survey, “More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support organ 




a natural control condition in which some participants received neither a descriptive norms 
message nor an injunctive norms message. This design also resulted in a condition in which 
some participants received a message featuring both a descriptive and an injunctive norm 
message, as well as two conditions where participants received either a descriptive or injunctive 
norms message only.  
The forceful language manipulation was included at the end of each organ donation 
message. In the high forceful language condition, the message concluded by saying, “The need is 
real! You must join your state organ and tissue donor registry today.” For the low forceful 
language condition, the message concluded by stating, “The choice is yours! Consider joining 
your state organ and tissue donor registry today.” Organ donation messages ranged in length 
from 59 to 87 words in total.  
Energy conservation. Energy conservation, specifically the purchase of energy efficient 
light bulbs, was chosen for two primary reasons. First, energy conservation is broadly applicable 
to most American adults, as a recent national survey (Osram Sylvania, 2016) demonstrates that 
94% of Americans say they are involved in home lighting purchasing decisions, with 64% 
reporting they are the sole decision maker for lighting purchases. Second, in contrast to the organ 
donation message, energy conservation provided a case in which collectively descriptive and 
injunctive norms are more closely aligned. This allowed for an examination of a topic whereby 
collective descriptive and injunctive norms are congruent.  
All energy conservation messages begin with a kernel message, adapted from the 
Department of Energy (2017), that stated, “Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home 
is an important way to reduce your household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs 




longer, and can help cut home energy costs.” The descriptive norm condition (present vs. absent) 
either included information about the prevalence of Americans who have purchased energy 
efficient light bulbs taken from a recent national survey (Osram Sylvania, 2016), “To date, more 
than 70% of Americans have purchased energy-efficient light bulbs for their home,” or provided 
no descriptive norm information. Likewise, the injunctive norm condition contained either 
information about American adults’ support towards purchasing energy efficient light bulbs 
taken from a recent national survey (Osram Sylvania, 2016), “More than 90% of Americans say 
they strongly support purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs,” or provided no injunctive norm 
information. As with the organ donation message, this design resulted in four conditions: (a) a 
control condition with no injunctive or descriptive norm information, (b) a combined condition 
with both descriptive and injunctive norm information, (c) a descriptive norm only condition, 
and (d) an injunctive norm only condition. 
The forceful language manipulation was included at the end of each energy conservation 
message. In the high forceful language condition, the message concluded by saying, “The need is 
real! You must purchase energy efficient light bulbs for your home today.” For the low forceful 
language condition, the message concluded by stating, “The choice is yours.” Consider 
purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for your home today.” Energy conservation messages 
ranged in length from 58 to 87 words in total.  
Measures 
 Unless otherwise noted, items are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = strongly 
disagree to 5 = strongly agree). See Tables 3 and 4 for a correlation matrix, means and standard 
deviations for all variables from the energy conservation and organ donation samples. See 




 Psychological reactance. Reactance was operationalized as anger and negative 
cognitions, and was measured in exactly the same manner as Study 1 (Dillard & Shen, 2005; 
Quick & Stephenson, 2008). The anger scale was reliable across both the organ donation (α 
= .92) and energy conservation (α = .91) samples. Participants who viewed the energy 
conservation message reported an average of 0.96 negative cognitions (SD = 1.60), whereas 
participants exposed to the organ donation message reported an average of 1.01 negative 
cognitions (SD = 1.45). 
 Freedom threat. Freedom threat was measured exactly the same as in Study 1 (Dillard & 
Shen, 2005). This 4-item scale (e.g., “The message tried to pressure me”) had acceptable 
reliability for both the energy conservation (α = .86) and organ donation (α = .82) samples. 
 Perceived descriptive norm. Perceived descriptive norm was measured with three items 
(e.g., “Most Americans [are registered organ donors/have purchased energy efficient light bulbs 
for their homes]) adapted from Park and colleagues (2009). This scale had excellent reliability 
for both the energy conservation (α = .95) and organ donation (α = .97) samples. 
 Perceived injunctive norm. Perceived injunctive norm was assessed with three items 
(e.g., “Most Americans would approve of [my registering as an organ donor/me purchasing 
energy efficient light bulbs for my home]”) adapted from Park and colleagues (2009). This scale 
had excellent reliability for both the energy conservation (α = .93) and organ donation (α = .95) 
samples. 
 Message elaboration. Message elaboration was measured with four items (e.g., “Overall, 
how much did the message make you think about [organ donation/energy conservation]”) 
adapted from Stephenson and Palmgreen (2001). The scale had acceptable reliability for both the 




 Attitude. Attitude was measured with four items (e.g., “[Registering as an organ 
donor/Purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my home] is a good thing for me to do”) based 
on recommendations from Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). This scale had acceptable reliability for 
both the energy conservation (α = .94) and organ donation (α = .86) samples. 
 Behavioral intention. Behavioral intention was measured with three items (e.g., “In the 
next month, I plan to [register as an organ donor/purchase energy efficient light bulbs for my 
home]”) based on recommendations from Fishbein and Ajzen (2010). This scale had acceptable 
reliability for both the energy conservation (α = .91) and organ donation (α = .97) samples. 
Results 
Data were screened for assumptions of multivariate normality (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007) prior to data analysis. Less than 1% of all data were missing (42 of 13,312 used for 
analysis = 0.32%), which is well below the problematic 5% threshold for missing data 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Missing data were screened and found to be missing completely at 
random (MCaR). Skewness and kurtosis of items fell within normal ranges (-2 to +2) with the 
exception of anger and negative cognitions. Specifically, in the energy sample, anger was both 
skewed (2.29) and kurtotic (5.00), and negative cognitions were both skewed (3.19) and kurtotic 
(18.04). In the organ donation sample, anger was both skewed (2.10) and kurtotic (4.06), and 
negative cognitions were kurtotic (3.25). Assumptions of homoscedascticity and homogeneity of 
variance were also met. Furthermore, multicollinearity was not a problem as all bivariate 
correlations between scales were modest (well below .90; see Tables 3 and 4). In conclusion, 
data for both the energy conservation and organ donation sample met nearly all the assumptions 






 As in Study 1, potential covariates were examined and a series of induction checks were 
conducted before primary analyses to ensure participants perceived differences between the 
various message conditions. There were no significant bivariate correlations between freedom 
threat and any covariates examined for both the energy conservation (age, biological sex, home 
ownership, role in home lighting purchases, political conservatism, education, and income, p 
> .05) and organ donation samples (age, biological sex, donor status, education, and income, p 
> .05). For the freedom threat induction check, an independent samples t-test was conducted for 
both topics. Message condition (low forceful language vs. high forceful language) served as the 
independent variable and freedom threat served as the dependent variable. For participants in the 
energy conservation sample, those who viewed the high forceful language message reported 
higher freedom threat (M = 3.17, SD = 0.98) than those who viewed the low forceful language 
message (M = 2.53, SD = 0.95), t(1, 251) = -5.25, p < .001. Likewise, for those participants in the 
organ donation sample, those who viewed the high forceful language message reported higher 
freedom threat (M = 2.86, SD = 0.99) than those who viewed the low forceful language message 
(M = 2.39, SD = 0.83), t(1, 255) = -4.10, p < .001. Thus, the forceful language manipulation was 
successful for both topics. 
To examine the main effects of the norm manipulations, a series of factorial ANOVAs 
were conducted. Message condition (descriptive vs. injunctive vs. combined [descriptive & 
injunctive] vs. control [no norm]) served as the independent variable and perceived descriptive 
and injunctive norms served as the dependent variables. Across all four conditions, participants 
did not differ in their perceived descriptive norm for both the energy conservation, F(3, 254) = 




norm conditions participants did not differ in their perceived injunctive norm for both the energy 
conservation, F(3, 251) = 0.14, p > .05, and organ donation samples, F(3, 252) = 0.81, p > .05. 
As in Study 1, the descriptive and injunctive norm message manipulations12 were unsuccessful in 
influencing perceived norms for both topics. As such, RQ1, RQ2, and H1 were unable to be 
satisfactorily examined in Study 2. Accordingly, perceived descriptive and injunctive norm were 
included in the structural model as exogenous variables preceding freedom threat (RQ3 and 
RQ4). 
See Figure 6 below for the revised hypothesized structural model for Study 2. 
 
 
Figure 6. Revised Hypothesized Structural Model (Study 2). 
 
                                               
12 Of note, participants did not differ in their freedom threat across all four norm conditions for both the energy 




 As in Study 1, an assumption of H3 was that participants would view the message 
arguments as strong. In order to ensure this assumption was met, a single sample t-test was 
conducted for both topics. All participants completed a 4-item13 measure of perceived message 
effectiveness (Dillard et al., 2007; α = .89 [energy conservation], α = .88 [organ donation]). The 
mean for perceived message effectiveness was significantly greater than the scale midpoint for 
both the energy conservation (M = 3.69, SD = 0.83), t(1, 251) = 13.09, p < .001, and organ 
donation sample (M = 3.88, SD = 0.82), t(1, 157) = 17.34, p < .001. Therefore, the assumption of 
strong arguments for H3 was met for both the energy conservation and organ donation samples.  
Data Analytic Procedures 
Data analytic procedures were the same as in Study 1. Structural equation modeling with 
the maximum likelihood robust14 (MLR) estimator in Mplus 7.4 for Mac was used to examine 
H2-H7, and RQ3-RQ4. A model was considered “acceptable” when RMSEA ≤ .08, CFI ≥ .90, 
and SRMR ≤ .09 (Holbert & Stephenson, 2008); model fit was considered “good” when  
RMSEA ≤ .06, CFI ≥ .95, SRMR ≤ .08 (Hu & Bentler, 1999; Kline, 2016). A two-step analysis 
procedure was utilized (Kline, 2016), with all latent factors undergoing a confirmatory factor 
analysis prior to testing the structural model. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The hypothesized models contained seven latent variables: (a) freedom threat, (b) anger, 
(c) attitude, (d) perceived descriptive norm, (e) perceived injunctive norm, (f) message 
elaboration, and (g) behavioral intention. Negative cognitions were represented with a single 
item observed variable. Forceful language was modeled as an observed variable (0 = low 
                                               
13 A 5-point (1 = strongly disagree, 5 = strongly agree) Likert scale asked participants their agreement with 
following statements: (a) “The message was believable,” (b) “The message was compelling,” (c) “The message was 
convincing,” and (d) “The message was effective.” 
14 MLR corrects for non-normality in data. Preliminary analyses revealed that both anger and negative cognitions 




forceful language, 1 = high forceful language). Overall, the measurement model demonstrated 
acceptable model fit for both the hypothesized energy conservation model, χ² (254, n = 254) = 
475.45, p < .001, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI = .050, .067), CFI = .94, SRMR = .04, and organ 
donation model, χ² (254, n = 258) = 469.55, p < .001, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI = .049, .065), CFI 
= .94, SRMR = .05. 
Invariance Testing 
 Examination of measurement invariance for sample topic (energy conservation vs. organ 
donation) was conducted prior to the main analysis using the same 4-step sequential process of 
multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis as described in Study 1 (Dimitrov, 2010; Wu et al., 
2007). Criteria for assessing of parameters between nested models included a non-significant 
χ² difference test, along with change in CFI < .01 (Cheung & Rensvold, 2002), and change in 
RMSEA < .015 (Chen, 2007). Invariance testing began by examining the assumption of 
configural invariance which examined if the factor structure of latent constructs were the same 
for the energy conservation and organ donation samples. The configural model demonstrated 
acceptable fit, χ² (526, N = 512) = 985.10, p < .001, RMSEA = .06 [90% CI = .053, .064), CFI 
= .94, SRMR = .05. In the next step, metric invariance was assessed by constraining factor 
loadings across groups to test the assumption of equivalence of the factor loadings across groups. 
The metric invariance model demonstrated acceptable fit, χ² (551, N = 512) = 1317.87, p < .001, 
RMSEA = .07 [90% CI = .069, .079], CFI = .90, SRMR = .08; however, change in CFI was 
> .01, change in RMSEA was > .015, and the χ² difference test was significant (Satorra-Bentler 
Scaled χ² [df = 25] = 433.36, p < .001). Therefore, given the non-invariance of the sample topics, 






The initial structural model for the energy conservation sample demonstrated acceptable 
fit, χ² (243, n = 254) = 528.96, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .060, .076), CFI = .92, with 
the exception of SRMR = .15. Modification indices suggested the addition of a path from 
message elaboration to reactance. The addition of this path improved the fit of the energy 
conservation structural model, χ² (242, n = 254) = 461.59, p < .001, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI 
= .051, .068), CFI = .94, SRMR = .08. The initial structural model for the organ donation sample 
demonstrated acceptable fit, χ² (243, n = 258) = 505.66, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI 
= .057, .073), CFI = .92, with the exception of SRMR = .12. Modification indices suggested the 
addition of a path from perceived injunctive norm to reactance. The addition of this path 
improved the fit of the organ donation structural model, χ² (242, n = 258) = 473.41, p < .001, 
RMSEA = .06 (90% CI = .053, .069), CFI = .93, SRMR = .08. The unstandardized (UPC) and 
standardized (SPC) path coefficients for both models, alongside their statistical significance, are 
presented below. See Figures 7 and 8 below for the final energy conservation and organ donation 








Figure 7. Final Structural Model for the Energy Conservation Sample 
Note. Unstandardized estimates are listed first, followed by standardized estimates in parentheses. Solid lines 
represent a priori hypotheses and research questions; dashed lines indicate post hoc modifications of the structural 
model. Forceful language was coded such that 0 = low forceful language, 1 = high forceful language. For visual 
simplicity, the interaction between forceful language and message elaboration on freedom threat is not shown in the 
model (UPC = -.17, SPC = -.09, p > .05). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. χ² (242, n = 254) = 461.59, p = .000, 
RMSEA = .06 (90% CI = .051, .068), CFI = .94, SRMR = .08. 
 
 
Figure 8. Final Structural Model for the Organ Donation Sample 
Note. Unstandardized estimates are listed first, followed by standardized estimates in parentheses. Solid lines 
represent a priori hypotheses and research questions; dashed lines indicate post hoc modifications of the structural 
model. Forceful language was coded such that 0 = low forceful language, 1 = high forceful language. For visual 
simplicity, the interaction between forceful language and message elaboration on freedom threat is not shown in the 
model (UPC = -.18, SPC = -.09, p > .05). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. χ² (242, n = 258) = 473.41, p = .000, 




H2 predicted that forceful language would be associated with greater freedom threat. A 
statistically significant positive associated between forceful language and freedom threat was 
observed for the energy conservation sample (UPC = .62/SPC = .33, p < .001) and organ 
donation sample (UPC = .45/SPC = .27, p < .001). H3 predicted that greater message elaboration 
would diminish freedom threat. A statistically significant negative association was observed 
between message elaboration and freedom threat for the organ donation sample (UPC = -.41, 
SPC = -.40, p < .001), but not for the energy conservation sample (UPC = -.09, SPC = -.09, p 
> .05). H4 predicted an interaction between message elaboration and forceful language. No 
statistically significant interaction was found in both the energy conservation sample (UPC = -
.17, SPC = -.09, p > .05), and the organ donation sample (UPC = -.18, SPC = -.09, p > .05). 
H5 predicted a positive association between freedom threat and reactance. As expected, 
statistically significant associations emerged between freedom threat and reactance for the 
energy conservation sample (UPC = .27/SPC = .52, p < .001) and the organ donation sample 
(UPC = .26/SPC = .62, p < .001). H6 predicted that reactance would be negatively associated 
with attitude towards the recommended response. As expected, a statistically significant 
association was observed between reactance and attitude for both the energy conservation sample 
(UPC = -1.37/SPC = -.79, p < .001) and the organ donation sample (UPC = -1.72/SPC = -.66, p 
< .001). H7 predicted that attitude towards the recommended response would be positively 
associated with intention to perform the recommended response. Consistent with this prediction, 
the results revealed a statistically significant positive association between attitude and intention 
for both the energy conservation sample (UPC = .73/SPC = .63, p < .001) and the organ donation 




RQ3 examined a potential relationship between perceived descriptive norm and freedom 
threat. No statistically significant relationship was observed between perceived descriptive norm 
and freedom threat in both the energy conservation sample (UPC = .02/SPC = .03, p > .05) and 
organ donation sample (UPC = -.01/SPC = -.02, p > .05). RQ4 examined a potential relationship 
between perceived injunctive norm and freedom threat. Perceived injunctive norm was 
significantly associated with freedom threat in the energy conservation sample (UPC = -.27/SPC 
= -.22, p < .001), but not the organ donation sample (UPC = .04/SPC =.04, p > .05). 
Post Hoc Modifications 
 As mentioned above, examination of modification indices following initial model misfit 
suggested the addition of a path from message elaboration to reactance for the energy 
conservation sample, and a path from perceived injunctive norm to reactance for the organ 
donation sample. Results indicated a negative relationship between message elaboration and 
reactance (UPC = -.29, SPC = -.56, p < .001) for the energy conservation structural model. For 
the organ donation model, results revealed a negative association between perceived injunctive 
norm and reactance (UPC = -.27, SPC = -.57, p < .001). No other post hoc modifications to the 
energy conservation and organ donation models were made.  
Indirect Effects and Variance Explained 
In addition to testing for the direct associations specified above, indirect associations 
examined using RMediation software (Tofighi & MacKinnon, 2011), which allows for the 
computation of 95% confidence intervals for mediated effects. RMediation tests revealed that: 
(a) freedom threat mediated the message elaboration and reactance relationship for the organ 
donation sample (95% CI = -0.196, -0.036), (b) freedom threat mediated the forceful language 




donation sample (95% CI = 0.036, 0.225), (c) reactance mediated the freedom threat and attitude 
relationship for both the energy conservation (95% CI = -0.575, -0.193) and organ donation 
sample (95% CI = -0.845, -0.143), (d) attitude mediated the reactance and intention relationship 
for both the energy conservation (95% CI = -1.349, -0.687) and organ donation sample (95% CI 
= -1.724, -0.540), and (e) freedom threat mediated the perceived injunctive norm and reactance 
relationship for the energy conservation sample (95% CI = -0.153, -0.009). For the energy 
conservation sample, reactance mediated the message elaboration and attitude relationship (95% 
CI = 0.255, 0.561). For the organ donation sample, reactance mediated the perceived injunctive 
norm and attitude relationship (95% CI = 0.208, 0.778). No other indirect effects were found. In 
all, the structural models accounted for the following variance in the endogenous variables for 
the energy conservation and organ donation samples, respectively: freedom threat (R2 = .19 




CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
The present dissertation sought to advance the literature on PRT in two primary ways. 
First, by examining the role of descriptive and injunctive norms messages as antecedents to 
freedom threat and reactance. Second, by examining message elaboration as an antecedent and 
moderator of the reactance process. The discussion section is organized as follows. First, the 
major findings from Study 1 and Study 2 are briefly summarized. Following this, the theoretical 
and practical implications of these findings are discussed. Finally, limitations of the dissertation, 
as well as future directions for research are considered. 
Summary of Major Findings 
 Descriptive and injunctive norm messages and freedom threat. RQ1 and RQ2 
inquired if a descriptive norm message (RQ1) and an injunctive norm message (RQ2) would be 
viewed as more freedom threatening than a control message absent any norms information. H1 
hypothesized that an injunctive norm message would be viewed as more freedom threatening 
than a control message. Induction checks demonstrated that across all four topics (alcohol, 
exercise, energy conservation, and organ donation) participants did not differ in their perceived 
descriptive norm, perceived injunctive norm, or freedom threat. Given the inability of these 
research questions and hypothesis to be adequately examined due to the failure of these induction 
checks, two additional research questions were introduced to examine the relationship between 
perceived descriptive norm (RQ3) and perceived injunctive norm (RQ4) on freedom threat. 
 Perceived descriptive and injunctive norm and freedom threat. Two research 
questions inquired about the relationship between perceived descriptive norm (RQ3) and 
perceived injunctive norm (RQ4) on freedom threat. In regards to RQ3, across all four topics, 
there was no observed association between perceived descriptive norm and freedom threat (RQ3). 




samples (alcohol, exercise, and energy conservation). However, in the energy conservation 
sample, a significant negative association between perceived injunctive norm and freedom threat 
was observed (SPC = -.22, p < .05). Furthermore, for the organ donation sample, modification 
indices suggested the addition of a direct pathway between perceived injunctive norm and 
reactance. The addition of this path was statistically significant (SPC = -.57, p < .001). In the 
alcohol sample, modification indices suggested the addition of a direct pathway between 
perceived injunctive norm and attitude. The addition of this path was statistically significant 
(SPC = .31, p < .01).  
 Forceful language and freedom threat. H2 hypothesized that the use of more forceful 
language (i.e., “You must…”) in a persuasive message would elicit greater freedom threat than a 
message featuring less forceful language (i.e., “Consider…”). H2 was supported across all four 
topics. 
 Message elaboration and freedom threat. H3 hypothesized that, assuming strong 
arguments, message elaboration would diminish freedom threat. Induction checks for all four 
topics indicated that participants perceived messages to be effective. Results indicated that 
message elaboration was significantly negatively associated with freedom threat for the alcohol 
sample (SPC = -.18, p < .05) and for the organ donation sample (SPC = -.41, p < .001). Message 
elaboration was unrelated to freedom threat for both the exercise and energy conservation 
samples. However, in both the exercise and energy conservation samples, modification indices 
suggested a direct path from message elaboration to reactance. The addition of this path was 
statistically significant for both the exercise sample (SPC = -.32, p < .001) and the energy 




 Interaction between message elaboration and forceful language. H4 proposed an 
interaction between message elaboration and forceful language on freedom threat. Specifically, 
H4 predicted that when message elaboration was low, and forceful language was high, 
individuals would experience the greatest level of freedom threat. No interaction between 
message elaboration and forceful language was observed for three of the topics (alcohol, energy 
conservation, organ donation). However, a statistically significant interaction was observed in 
the exercise sample. A decomposition of this interaction (see Figure 5) revealed that when 
participants viewed a message with high forceful language and were engaged in a high level of 
message elaboration (+1SD) they experienced the lowest level of freedom threat. 
 Freedom threat, reactance, attitude, and intention. H5-H7 focused on the 
consequences of freedom threat and reactance. Specifically, H5 predicted freedom threat would 
be positively associated with reactance. In turn, H6 predicted that reactance would be negatively 
associated with favorable attitude towards the recommended response. Finally, H7 predicted that 
favorable attitude towards the recommended response would be positively associated with 
intention to adopt the recommended response. H5, H6, and H7 were supported across all four 
topics.   
Theoretical Implications 
The current investigation was the first to examine both descriptive and injunctive norms 
messages as antecedents to psychological reactance. Given the undesirable consequences of 
reactance including diminished attitudes (Quick et al., 2015; Shen, 2015) and intentions (Rains & 
Turner, 2007; Quick & Kim, 2009), scholars in recent years have been interested in identifying 
the message features most likely to elicit or inhibit reactance (Quick et al., 2013). To date, 




norms messages and reactance using a validated measurement of reactance (Dillard & Shen, 
2005; Quick & Stephenson, 2008). This is surprising, given that perceived descriptive and 
injunctive norms are central components of many behavior change theories including the focus 
theory of normative conduct (Cialdini et al., 1990), the reasoned action approach (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010), and the theory of normative social behavior (Rimal & Real, 2005).  
 Across four topics and two populations, descriptive and injunctive norms messages did 
not affect perceived descriptive or injunctive norms. This null finding has considerable 
theoretical importance. Within the literature on norms messages there are relatively few studies 
that seek to experimentally manipulate perceived descriptive norm (Glazer et al., 2010; Lapinski 
et al., 2007; Rimal, 2008), and even fewer that experimentally manipulate perceived injunctive 
norm (Lapinski et al., 2008; Prince & Carey, 2010; Smith & Louis, 2008). Often, experimental 
manipulations of social norms involve experimental conditions whereby a norm is presented 
(often artificially) as being either very high or very low (e.g., Lapinski et al., 2007; Rimal et al., 
2005; Smith & Louis, 2008). For instance, in Lapinski and colleagues (2007) study, participants 
were either told that only 3% of the university community was taking steps to conserve water 
(low-descriptive norm condition), or that 90% of the university community was conserving water 
(high-descriptive norm condition). The use of this approach in order to maximize variance 
between experimental conditions is understandable, however, the external validity of these 
findings is questionable. Even less common are experiments – as was the case in the current 
investigation – where an accurate norm (descriptive or injunctive) is compared to a no-norm 
control condition (e.g., Rimal, 2008). Unfortunately, few published studies report on failed norm 
inductions, perhaps due to concerns about the difficulty of getting null-findings published 




 Another complication in inducing perceptions of descriptive and injunctive norms is that 
both norms may inherently convey information about one other (Blanton et al., 2008). For 
instance, interventions that emphasize a high frequency of a behavior (i.e., high descriptive 
norm) may also suggest a high approval for that behavior (i.e., high injunctive norm). Consider 
the following descriptive norm message from Goldstein, Cialdini, and Griskevicius (2008), 
“Almost 75% of guests who are asked to participate in our new resource savings program do 
help [emphasis added] by using their towels more than once” (p. 474). In this example, the use of 
the word “help” – while meant to convey behavior (i.e., descriptive norm) – may also imply the 
social desirability (i.e., injunctive norm) of the conservation program. Conversely, interventions 
that emphasize a high approval for a behavior (i.e., high injunctive norm) may also suggest a 
high frequency of a behavior (i.e., high descriptive norm). Consider the following injunctive 
norm message from Bolsen (2013), “The vast majority of Illinois residents support [emphasis 
added] energy conservation…” (p. 7). In this example, the use of the word “support,” though 
referring to an injunctive norm (i.e., many Illinois residents believe energy conservation is a 
socially desirable behavior), may unintentionally imply that many Illinois residents are engaging 
in energy conservation efforts (i.e., high descriptive norm). Similarly, the descriptive and 
injunctive norm messages in the current investigation may also have been inherently confounded 
with one another (see Appendix A and Appendix C). 
 An alternative interpretation of the null findings regarding the descriptive and injunctive 
norm message inductions is that a short (~50 words) print message may have simply been unable 
to significantly influence participants’ perceived norms on the message topic. Individuals 
develop their perceptions of descriptive and injunctive norms from a variety of sources, 




(Rimal & Real, 2005), and through conversations with friends and family (Real & Rimal, 2007). 
Applied methods for distributing normative information to target audiences typically rely on one 
of three strategies: (a) the social norms approach, whereby a coordinated campaign disseminates 
factual information to correct normative misperceptions about the prevalence of an undesirable 
behavior (e.g., excessive drinking) via campaign messages (e.g., posters, t-shirts, email), (b) 
personalized normative feedback, whereby individuals complete a demographic questionnaire 
and are provided with specific feedback on how the frequency of their behavior (e.g., recycling) 
compares with that of their peers, and (c) focus group discussions, where facilitators lead live 
interactive groups through a discussion of the misperceptions surrounding a particular topic, and 
the causes and consequences of these misperceptions (Miller & Prentice, 2016). The method for 
inducing norms within the current investigation is conceptually most similar to the first method 
described (i.e., social norms approach). The latter two methods of personalized normative 
feedback and focus group discussions undoubtedly provide a greater magnitude of normative 
information than what can be included in a single message (Miller & Prentice, 2016). The 
primary limitation of these latter two methods for inducing norms – within both experiments and 
broader campaign efforts – is the labor-intensive nature of these interventions. Further 
examination of strategies for effectively inducing perceived descriptive and injunctive norms 
within experimental messages, as well as campaign efforts, is an important avenue for future 
work. For instance, the use of print messages with a visual element reinforcing the norms 
information highlighted in the message may provide a stronger norm message induction. 
 Another issue to consider is social distance of the referent group used in the descriptive 
and injunctive norm messages. In the current investigation, the referent groups used were quite 




emanating from more proximal referent groups hold a stronger influence on behavior than those 
norms emanating from more distal referent groups (Campo et al., 2003; Neighbors et al., 2007, 
2010; Rimal & Lapinski, 2015). For instance, Neighbors and colleagues (2010) found that in the 
context of college student drinking, the more strongly participants identified with a proximal 
referent group (i.e., same-sex, same-race, or same-Greek status), the stronger the association 
between their perceived descriptive norm of that referent group and their own drinking. This 
association did not hold when the referent group was more distal (i.e., ‘typical’ student on 
campus). A similar finding was observed by Woolf, Rimal, and Sripad (2014), in their 
examination of high school athletes’ intentions to use anabolic steroids. Their results 
demonstrated a stronger relationship between perceived descriptive norm and intention when the 
referent group was more socially proximal (i.e., close friends, team members) than when the 
referent group was more socially distal (i.e., professional athletes, college athletes). 
 Another factor to consider is the framing of the norms messages used in the current study. 
Descriptive and injunctive norms can both proscribe and prescribe in the sense that they can 
highlight appropriate and inappropriate social behavior (Lapinski & Rimal, 2005; Mizruchi & 
Perruci, 1962). Similarly, persuasive health recommendations can commonly be framed in either 
a proscriptive manner (i.e., don’t smoke, don’t eat too many high calorie foods) or prescriptive 
manner (i.e., exercise more regularly, eat more fruits and vegetables). A recent study by Pavey, 
Sparks, and Churchill (2018) found that compared to a prescriptive anti-drinking message, a 
proscriptive anti-drinking message resulted in stronger moral norms to drink responsibly, and in 
turn was associated with diminished reactance. In the current study, all four recommended 
behaviors were framed in such a way that behavior was prescribed (e.g., drink responsibly, 




drink responsibly, most Americans support organ donation). Therefore, future work may benefit 
from examining the interaction between norm type (i.e., descriptive vs. injunctive) and normative 
message framing (i.e., proscriptive vs. prescriptive) on reactance. 
From a message design standpoint, these results would suggest that emphasizing closer 
referent groups in descriptive and injunctive norm messages would likely constitute a fruitful 
strategy, not only for experimental inductions, but also for campaign efforts. However, despite 
evidence showing that norms from more proximal referent groups are more impactful on 
individuals’ behavior than those from more distal referent groups (Neighbors et al., 2010; Woolf 
et al., 2014), a practical consideration is the plausibility of manipulating proximal referent groups 
in social norms messages. A major consideration is the believability of the message, as social 
norms messages can often be met with a certain level of skepticism by audience members (Miller 
& Prentice, 2016; Real & Rimal, 2007). Although it may be possible to manipulate normative 
perceptions of a more distal referent group (e.g., ‘typical’ college student at a university), this 
becomes more difficult in the case of closer referents (e.g., friends, family). As individuals have 
greater access to normative information on closer referents such as friends and family than they 
do for more distal referents (e.g., ‘typical’ college student), these message manipulations run the 
risk of being hampered by believability concerns (Lapinski et al., 2008). 
From a theoretical standpoint, the fact that perceived injunctive norm – but not perceived 
descriptive norm – was associated with freedom threat and reactance is interesting. Across the 
four topics, perceived injunctive norm arose as a more consistent predictor of freedom threat and 
reactance than did perceived descriptive norm. More specifically, in none of the four topics was 
perceived descriptive norm associated with either freedom threat or reactance. In contrast, 




conservation sample, and had a direct negative effect on reactance in the organ donation sample. 
This finding suggests that a stronger perceived injunctive norm may have buffered participants 
against the experience of freedom threat and reactance. However, the directionality of this 
relationship is not entirely clear. Given the cross-sectional nature of data collection, an 
alternative model could place perceived descriptive and injunctive norms as an outcome of 
reactance, rather than antecedents. In other words, perhaps reactance may impact individuals 
perceptions of the prevalence (i.e., descriptive norm) and social acceptability (i.e., injunctive 
norm) of a behavior, similar to how reactance influences attitudes, intentions, source and 
message evaluations (Quick et al., 2013). Of note, alternative structural models featuring 
perceived descriptive and injunctive norms as outcomes of reactance (rather than antecedents) 
demonstrated near identical fit for all four samples, with the alternative models fitting slightly 
better for the alcohol sample15, and slightly worse for the exercise, energy conservation, and 
organ donation samples16. Future work would benefit from the use of alternative study designs 
(e.g., longitudinal designs) that can better disentangling the causal ordering of the relationship 
between perceived descriptive norm, perceived injunctive norm, freedom threat, and reactance. 
  The findings from Study 1 and Study 2 also have theoretical implications for the 
reactance modeling process. Following the recommendation of Quick and colleagues (Quick & 
Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), in the current investigation, reactance was 
                                               
15 Alcohol (original model): χ² (243, n = 160) = 408.31, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .054, .076), CFI = .91, 
SRMR = .11. Alcohol (alternative model): χ² (243, n = 160) = 399.15, p < .001, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI 
= .052, .074), CFI = .92, SRMR = .10. 
16 Exercise (original model): χ² (243, n = 163) = 440.32, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .060, .081), CFI = .91, 
SRMR = .11. Exercise (alternative model): χ² (243, n = 163) = 449.50, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI 
= .062, .083), CFI = .91, SRMR = .11.  
Energy conservation (original model): χ² (243, n = 254) = 528.96, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .060, .076), 
CFI = .92, SRMR = .15. Energy conservation (alternative model): χ² (243, n = 254) = 554.67, p < .001, RMSEA 
= .07 (90% CI = .063, .079), CFI = .91, SRMR = .16.  
Organ donation (original model): χ² (243, n = 258) = 505.66, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% CI = .057, .073), CFI 
= .92, SRMR = .12. Organ donation (alternative model): χ² (243, n = 258) = 531.26, p < .001, RMSEA = .07 (90% 




modeled as a two-step process with freedom threat serving as the proximal antecedent to 
reactance (operationalized as a combination of anger and negative cognitions; Dillard & Shen, 
2005). The rationale for modeling the reactance process using this approach is that individuals 
could experience anger and negative thoughts in response to a persuasive message for any 
number of reasons unrelated to having their freedom threatened or eliminated. Therefore, Quick 
and his colleagues (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2008) have argued that to 
fully test the reactance process as specified by PRT, researchers should examine the impact of 
any antecedent to reactance by directly examining how that antecedent impacts freedom threat, 
followed by reactance. As Quick and colleagues (2013) write, “Inclusion of the threat induction 
check creates a more demanding and theoretically precise test of the theoretical process under 
scrutiny…[and] permits persuasion practitioners to trace the effects of their appeals or campaigns 
through the [reactance] process from beginning to end” (p. 179).  
Despite following the two-step approach to modeling reactance (Quick & Considine, 
2008; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), modification indices for three of the four models suggested 
the addition of a direct path from an exogenous variable (message elaboration in the exercise and 
energy conservation samples; perceived injunctive norm in the organ donation sample) to 
reactance. That is, several of the variables examined in the current investigation were not directly 
associated with freedom threat, but instead had a direct association on reactance. The addition of 
these modifications to the structural model substantively improved model fit. However, 
empirically driven respecifications of structural models should be interpreted with caution, as 
such respecifications are very likely to reflect sample specific variation (i.e., sampling error; see 
Goodboy & Kline, 2017). The fact, however, that in three of the four samples the suggested 




provides evidence for the robustness of this finding. Unfortunately, there is a lack of uniformity 
in the field in terms of how researchers model psychological reactance vis-à-vi freedom threat. 
At least four approaches to modeling freedom threat and reactance are used. In the first and most 
common approach, scholars follow Quick and colleagues (Quick & Considine, 2008; Quick & 
Stephenson, 2008) advice by modeling the impact of all exogenous variables on reactance as 
mediated by freedom threat (Kim, 2017; LaVoie et al., 2017; Quick et al., 2015; Richards & 
Larsen, 2017). In the second approach, researchers examine the direct effects of exogenous 
variables on both freedom threat and reactance (Gardner & Leshner, 2016; Katz, Bryne, & Kent, 
2017; Lee & Cameron, 2017). In the third approach, researchers establish a relationship between 
freedom threat and reactance, but examine only the direct effects of exogenous variables on 
reactance (Lienemann & Siegel, 2016). In the fourth approach, researchers have excluded 
examining freedom threat as an induction check on reactance entirely (Kim, Levine, & Allen, 
2017), though this approach is certainly ill advised. The data presented in the current study 
suggest there may be utility to the second approach; that is examining the direct effects of 
exogenous variables on freedom threat, as well as on reactance. Future research would benefit by 
examining which of these four approaches produces the most reliable and valid measurement of 
PRT by placing each approach within a nomothetic network (see Quick, 2012). 
 The findings from the current investigation also have theoretical implications for theories 
of message processing including the ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999) 
and HSM (Chaiken, 1980; Chen & Chaiken, 1999). Across all four topics, greater message 
elaboration was associated with either diminished freedom threat (alcohol, organ donation) or 
diminished reactance (exercise, energy conservation). To date, several benefits of greater 




change, more resistant attitudes to counter persuasion, and attitude change that is more predictive 
of future behavior (O’Keefe, 2013). In addition to these outcomes, the findings from the current 
investigation indicate that another benefit of greater message elaboration may also be the 
inhibition of freedom threat and reactance. In other words, persuasion that occurs via high 
message elaboration is beneficial not only in the long-term via more enduring and resistant 
attitude change, but also in the short term via diminished resistance to persuasive arguments in 
the form of psychological reactance. Future research should continue to examine this proposition, 
as well as boundary conditions of this finding (e.g., issue involvement, argument strength, prior 
knowledge). 
 The observed interaction between message elaboration and forceful language in the 
exercise sample is also a novel finding. Interestingly, the interaction was such that under 
conditions of greater message elaboration and the presence of forceful language, freedom threat 
was diminished. In other words, when participants were paying close attention to a message with 
forceful language present, they experienced the lowest level of freedom threat. On the face of it, 
this finding appears to be inconsistent with the predictions of PRT. However, one potential 
explanation for this observed relationship might be that individuals who processed the message 
arguments carefully appreciated the frankness of the forceful message (“You simply have to do 
it!”). Another possible explanation for this finding is due to the particularities of the topic – 
exercise promotion – in which this interaction was observed. The use of forceful language in 
exercise promotional messages is ubiquitous (e.g., “Just Do It.”). Therefore, it may be that 
individuals are inoculated against forceful language in this context, and in some cases may even 
see more forceful language as empowering (Ntoumanis, Quested, Reeve, & Cheon, 2018). 




finding should be interpreted cautiously. Future research should seek to replicate this finding 
across topics and populations. 
Practical Implications 
 The findings from the current investigation hold numerous practical implications for the 
design of persuasive messages. First, perhaps the most consequential practical finding of the 
current investigation is the consistency of the observed relationship between message elaboration, 
freedom threat, and reactance. Specifically, message elaboration was negatively associated with 
freedom threat in the alcohol and organ donation samples. In the exercise and energy 
conservation samples, message elaboration was negatively associated with reactance. In other 
words, in every topic examined, greater message elaboration was associated with lower reactance 
either directly, or as mediated by freedom threat. The consistency of these findings across four 
persuasive topics and across two different populations (college students and adult Internet users) 
further supports the robustness of this finding.  
 From a practical standpoint, the consistent association between message elaboration and 
diminished freedom threat and reactance suggests the importance of encouraging greater 
message elaboration among target audiences. Experimental research on the ELM (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & Wegener, 1999) has demonstrated that there are two critical 
determinants of the level of message elaboration an individual engages in: (a) motivation, an 
individual’s desire to engage in issue-relevant thought, and (b) ability, an individual’s capability 
for issue-relevant thought (O’Keefe, 2013). In respect to motivation, one method for prompting 
greater message elaboration is to increase the perceived personal relevance of a topic (Johnson & 
Eagly, 1989; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979). A large body of research demonstrates that individuals 




messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 1979; Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty, Cacioppo, & 
Schumann, 1983). For practitioners, health messages tailored to match the particular health 
concerns of an audience member (Petty, Barden, & Wheeler, 2009), or tailored to match their 
stage of change (Prochaska, Redding, & Evers, 2015; Prochaska & Velicer, 1997), are likely to 
result in greater message elaboration. Another strategy persuaders can use to increase message 
elaboration is to use persuasive messages that are surprising (Baker & Petty, 1994), as this 
prompts individuals to more closely examine a message’s arguments. Further, in support of this 
approach, there is evidence that messages viewed as novel may also directly diminish freedom 
threat (Quick, 2013; Xu, 2015). In respect to ability, whenever possible persuaders should 
present their messages in environments without distractions, as the presence of a distraction 
diminishes individuals’ ability to elaborate (Petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976). Furthermore, the use 
of language that is easily understood by the target audience (Hafer, Reynolds, & Obertynski, 
1996; Yalch & Elmore-Yalch, 1984) can also promote message elaboration. Finally, the use of 
mediums that allow for self-pacing (i.e., the use of written rather than audio or visual media; 
Chaiken & Eagly, 1976) can also aid in promoting elaboration ability among target audiences. 
 Another practical implication from the current investigation is the observed relationship 
between perceived injunctive norm, freedom threat, and reactance. Specifically, greater 
perceived injunctive norm was associated with diminished freedom threat in the energy 
conservation sample, and diminished reactance for the organ donation sample. From a practical 
standpoint, these findings suggest persuaders would benefit by emphasizing injunctive norms in 
their messages. Indeed, recent work in applied settings (Cialdini et al., 2006; Lawrence, 2015) 
demonstrates the utility of injunctive norm messages for encouraging behavior change. However, 




study, changing perceived injunctive norms is difficult. Therefore, it is likely that in order to 
effectively change perceived injunctive norms among a target audience, a heavier emphasis on 
either the social sanctions associated with non-compliance, or the social approval associated with 
compliance may be needed. Though the current study did not find evidence that the inclusion of 
injunctive norms information in a message enhanced freedom threat, it is possible that injunctive 
norm messages that more strongly emphasize social pressure to act in a particular way will result 
in boomerang effects due to reactance (Brehm, 1966, Brehm & Brehm, 1981). In line with this 
concern, recent work by Bosson and colleagues (2015) found that an injunctive norm message 
promoting egalitarian treatment of women resulted in boomerang effects among a sub-set of men 
(those high in hostile sexist attitudes). Therefore, persuaders wishing to utilize injunctive norm 
messages within their promotional efforts should conduct adequate pilot testing of messages to 
ensure injunctive norm messages do not result in reactance or other unintended effects (Cho & 
Salmon, 2006).  
Limitations 
The methodological decisions made for the current investigation inherently led to certain 
limitations. For instance, Study 1 and Study 2 both used print messages as the chosen message 
medium. Accordingly, these results may not be generalizable to other message formats (e.g., 
audio, visual). The current investigation was also limited by the use of an experimental design. 
Participants viewed experimental messages fully aware they were participating in a research 
study, and that we were interested in their thoughts about the message. The major strength of an 
experimental design, however, is that it allows for strong internal validity and ruling out of 
potential alternative explanations. A related limitation of the current study was the use of self-




individuals may be imperfectly able to report their inner thoughts and feelings, and may be 
motivated by social desirability concerns to provide a particular response. Though the use of an 
online questionnaire – with a guarantee of the confidentially of responses – potentially limits 
social desirability concerns, this issue cannot be entirely ruled out by the study design. In 
particular, the four topics chosen (responsible alcohol consumption, regular exercise, energy 
conservation, and organ donation) were all topics that may have potentially raised social 
desirability concerns.  
 Another limitation of the current investigation was the use of two convenience samples: 
(a) a sample of undergraduate students recruited from communication classes (Study 1), and (b) 
a sample of adult Internet users recruited from MTurk (Study 2). Considering the demographic 
characteristics of both samples, the generalizability of these findings to the other populations, 
particularly those outside the United States, is somewhat limited (Heinrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). However, there are a few reasons why the convenience samples used in 
Study 1 and Study 2 are appropriate. First, across both studies, the topics were specifically 
chosen to be relevant to the target population. In Study 1, alcohol and exercise are relevant topics 
for college students as they are a group disproportionally affected by the outcomes of excessive 
drinking (CDC, 2012; Hingson et al., 2009; National Institute on Alcohol and Alcoholism, 2015), 
and college is a critical developmental window for developing and reinforcing acceptable 
physical activity and weight management (Lloyd-Richardson et al., 2009). In Study 2, organ 
donation and energy conservation were chosen as topics that both are broadly applicable to most 
American adults, given that all Americans can register their consent to donation in the event of 
their death (UNOS, 2017), and given that nearly all Americans play some role in their home 




homogenous convenience samples for the current investigation was also beneficial as the 
homogeneity of these samples increased the power to detect small effects. Third, when 
considering the limitations of convenience samples it is also important to draw a distinction 
between research that seeks prediction and research that seeks understanding (Mook, 1983, 
1989). For research that seeks understanding (rather than predictions), convenience samples are 
justifiable so long as they are appropriate for drawing valid conclusions about the underlying 
theoretical mechanisms or process of interest (Boster & Sherry, 2010). Since the current 
investigation was focused on testing novel hypotheses about theoretical mechanisms, not making 
broad generalizations about message effects in particular populations, the use of both of these 
convenience samples is appropriate.  
Future Directions 
Several future directions for research logically flow from the findings of the current 
investigation. The most pressing question still unanswered in the current investigation – and the 
primary impetus for both studies – is the relationship between descriptive and injunctive norms 
messages and reactance. Simply put, does the inclusion of descriptive or injunctive norms 
information with a persuasive message affect freedom threat or not? One interpretation of the 
findings from Study 1 and Study 2 suggests that they do not, as freedom threat did not vary 
across the norms conditions. In the current investigation, however, following recommendations 
from O’Keefe (2003), induction checks were utilized to verify that the message feature of 
interest (i.e., descriptive and injunctive norms messages) impacted the hypothesized explanatory 
mechanism (i.e., perceived descriptive and injunctive norm) thought to pre-empt the persuasive 
outcome of interest (i.e., freedom threat and reactance). Therefore, due to the inability of the 




norms, this question was unable to be answered satisfactorily. Future research would benefit by 
reexamining this issues across new topics and samples. For instance, a novel or completely 
fictional topic (see Quick, LaVoie, Reynolds-Tylus, Martinez Gonzalez, & Skurka, 2018) may 
provide a more amendable context for inducing normative perceptions. The consistency of the 
failure of these inductions, however, should give researchers wishing to examine this issue pause. 
Clearly, future work in this area would benefit from extensive pilot testing of experimental 
messages.  
Future work should also continue to examine the role of message elaboration and the 
reactance process. The current study relied on a general measure of message elaboration drawn 
from Stephenson and Palmgreen’s (2001) work. The ELM (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Petty & 
Wegener, 1999), however, is more than just a theory about message elaboration. For instance, a 
large body of work has identified factors that influence the amount of elaboration that message 
recipients undergo. In particular, work within the tradition of the ELM has focused on 
individuals’ motivation, or desire to engage in issue-relevant thought, as well as individuals’ 
ability, or capability of issue-relevant thought, as critical determinants of the amount of 
elaboration individuals engage in (see O’Keefe, 2013). In respect to motivation, involvement 
(Perloff, 2003), or personal relevance of the topic, and need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1982), an individual-difference variable representing the degree to which individuals engage in 
and enjoy thinking, have been identified as factors associated with greater message elaboration 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996; Petty et al., 1983). In respect to elaboration ability, 
two factors that can inhibit message elaboration are a lack of prior knowledge on a topic 
(Laczniak, Muehling, & Carlson, 1991) as well as the presence of a distraction (Lammers & 




motivation and ability were not explicitly examined. Accordingly, future research would benefit 
by explicitly examining involvement, need for cognition, as well as prior knowledge of the topic 
as moderating influences on elaboration. Though the presence of a distraction is likely not an 
issue in experimental studies of reactance, given the increased use of online platforms for data 
collection such as MTurk (Sheehan, 2018), methods for assessing or ruling out distraction should 
be considered more closely. 
Another promising direction for future research is to examine involvement more broadly 
as an antecedent and moderator of the reactance process. Involvement is broadly defined as the 
extent to which a topic or issue is personally relevant or significant to an individual (Perloff, 
2003). One of the basic tenants of PRT is that as an issue increases in importance, reactance 
should also increase (Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981). As Brehm (1966) states, “The 
magnitude of reactance aroused by the loss of a given freedom is directly proportional to the 
importance of that freedom to the individual” (p. 11). However, despite the clarity by which 
Brehm (1966) laid out this tenant of PRT, little empirical research has examined the moderating 
role of involvement on reactance (Quick et al., 2013). One exception is Quick and colleagues 
(2011), who found no direct effect of involvement on freedom threat, but did find a three-way 
interaction between involvement, forceful language, and reactance proneness within the context 
of organ donation. Specifically, the authors found that freedom threat perceptions were highest 
among those high in reactance proneness with low-issue involvement who viewed a message 
with high forceful language; a finding inconsistent with what PRT would predict (Brehm, 1966; 
Brehm & Brehm, 1981). However, one limitation of Quick and colleagues’ (2011) study was 
their reliance on a single measure of involvement (i.e., Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). Compelling 




made supporting the conclusion that involvement is a multidimensional construct – comprised of 
impression-, outcome-, and value-relevant involvement – with differential effects on the 
persuasion process. In short, impression-relevant involvement refers to individuals’ self-
presentation concerns related to the issue at hand; outcome-relevant involvement refers to the 
relevance of an issue for achieving some instrumental goal; and value-relevant involvement 
refers to the relationship between an issue and one’s enduring values (Johnson & Eagly, 1989). 
As Quick and colleagues (2011) indicate, “Future research could examine the role of each 
dimension [of involvement] as a moderator of PRT as each may affect the PRT process 
differently” (p. 674). Therefore, given the dearth of research on the moderating role of 
involvement on the reactance process, as well as theoretical (Johnson & Eagly, 1989) and 
empirical (Cho & Boster, 2005) arguments in support of a multidimensional conceptualization of 
involvement, a closer examination of the role of impression-, outcome-, and value-relevant 
involvement on the reactance process is warranted. 
Another fertile area for future research on the relationship between social norms and 
reactance is to examine the moderating role of group identity. Group identity, a concept 
grounded in the social identity perspective (Tajfel, 1982), refers to feelings of affinity or 
connectedness towards a particular social group (Rimal & Real, 2003). Studies have long shown 
the strong role that individuals’ social networks play in initiating and reinforcing negative 
(Dorsey, Sherer, & Real, 1999; Fraser & Hawkins, 1984) and positive (House, Landis, & 
Umberson, 1988) health behaviors. Indeed, empirical work has shown that stronger identification 
with a social group has been shown to enhance the likelihood of that one will be influenced by 
members of this group (Christensen, Rothgerber, Wood, & Matz, 2004; Neighbors et al., 2010; 




college student drinking, the more strongly participants identified with a proximal referent group 
(i.e., same-sex, same-race, or same-Greek status), the stronger the association was between 
participants’ perceived descriptive norm and their own drinking. This association did not hold 
when the referent group was more distal (i.e., ‘typical’ student on campus). In respect to 
reactance arousal, it is likely that a stronger identification with the social group used in a 
persuasive message will diminish freedom threat. In support of this position, previous work has 
shown that greater perceived similarity to a communicator is related to greater source liking, and 
subsequently decreased resistance to persuasive attempts (Silvia, 2005). To date, however, no 
work has examined the group identity as an antecedent to reactance using a validated 
measurement of reactance (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & Stephenson, 2008).  
A final promising area for future research is a reexamination of the measurement of 
psychological reactance. Despite the considerable advances in the measurement of reactance 
made within the past two decades (Dillard & Shen, 2005; Quick & Stephenson, 2008), future 
work should continue to refine the operationalization of reactance. Recent meta-analytic work by 
Rains (2013) shows that anger is a stronger indicator of latent reactance than negative cognitions 
(λ = .62 vs. λ = .52), and that anger more strongly correlates with attitude (r = .20) than does 
negative cognitions (r = .16). The results from the four topics examined here also support these 
findings, as anger was a stronger indicator of latent reactance than negative cognitions in all four 
samples, and anger more strongly correlated with attitude than did negative cognitions in every 
sample. Similarly, Rains (2013) meta-analysis also found that the zero-order correlation between 
anger and negative cognitions is rather low (r = .31), perhaps suggesting potential issues with 
Dillard and Shen’s (2005) operationalization of reactance. Though the zero-order correlations 




[alcohol], r = .51 [exercise], and r = .52 [energy conservation]; see Tables 1-3), this correlation 
was fairly low for the organ donation sample (r = .34; see Table 4).  
A further limitation of the current measurement of reactance is the somewhat 
cumbersome nature for assessing negative cognitions. Given the complexity of implementing 
this technique and analyzing these data, some authors have adopted alternative approaches for 
measuring negative cognitions (Quick et al., 2015; Varava & Quick, 2015), implemented 
alternative measurements of reactance with inferior validity (Reinhart et al., 2007), or in some 
cases simply neglected to assess negative cognitions at all (Xu, 2015). Clearly, work should 
continue to develop strategies to more efficiently and effectively gauge reactance, particularly 
outside of laboratory settings. For instance, future research could compare the thought-listing 
procedure for measuring negative cognitions (Dillard & Shen, 2005) with alternative 
measurements of negative cognitions (e.g., Silvia, 2006) in order to demonstrate which method 
produces more reliable and valid results.  
Conclusion 
 The purpose of the current investigation was to advance our understanding of PRT by 
examining descriptive and injunctive norm messages, as well as message elaboration as 
antecedents to psychological reactance. Across two studies, participants (undergraduates [N = 
405]; adult Internet users [N = 655]) were randomly assigned to view messages on four topics 
(alcohol, exercise, energy conservation, and organ donation). Results indicated that the inclusion 
of descriptive and injunctive norms information in a message was not associated with freedom 
threat. Perceived injunctive norm, however, was negatively associated with freedom threat or 
reactance in two of the topics. Furthermore, message elaboration was negatively associated with 




language forcefulness was also observed in the exercise sample. Findings from this dissertation 
were discussed in terms of the theoretical and practical contributions of the current investigation. 
Several promising areas for future research were also identified.  






Zero-order Correlation Matrix, Means and Standard Deviations for Alcohol Study Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Anger ---        
2. Negative Cognitions .48** ---       
3. Freedom Threat .46** .44** ---      
4. Perceived Descriptive Norm -.13 -.15 -.02 ---     
5. Perceived Injunctive Norm -.07 -.07 .05 .39** ---    
6. Message Elaboration -.22** -.13 -.13 .08 .03 ---   
7. Attitude -.21** -.20* .03 .22** .23** .16 ---  
8. Intention -.18* -.21** -.01 .29** .28** .27** .67** --- 
Mean 1.48 1.40 2.81 1.96 2.85 2.47 3.64 3.01 
SD 0.62 1.78 0.91 0.82 0.76 0.94 0.85 1.11 








Zero-order Correlation Matrix, Means and Standard Deviations for Exercise Study Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Anger ---        
2. Negative Cognitions .51** ---       
3. Freedom Threat .47** .33** ---      
4. Perceived Descriptive Norm -.03 -.13 -.02 ---     
5. Perceived Injunctive Norm .18* -.13 -.12 .32** ---    
6. Message Elaboration -.30** -.31* -.15 .14 .23** ---   
7. Attitude -.34** -.09 -.17 .07 .35** .24** ---  
8. Intention -.11 -.16*  .01 .11 .21** .26** .45** --- 
Mean 1.38 0.92 2.60 3.21 3.86 3.16 4.32 3.83 
SD 0.60 1.45 0.96 0.91 0.73 0.88 0.64 1.08 







Zero-order Correlation Matrix, Means and Standard Deviations for Energy Conservation Study 
Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Anger ---        
2. Negative Cognitions .52** ---       
3. Freedom Threat .52** .37** ---      
4. Perceived Descriptive Norm -.20** .01 -.13* ---     
5. Perceived Injunctive Norm -.38** -.09 -.19** .47** ---    
6. Message Elaboration -.42** -.37** -.20** .26** .35** ---   
7. Attitude -.57** -.49** -.38** .28** .50** .58** ---  
8. Intention -.32** -.36** -.21** .17** .32** .43** .61** --- 
Mean 1.36 0.96 2.88 3.73 3.87 3.30 3.95 3.22 
SD 0.65 1.60 1.01 0.84 0.77 1.02 0.89 1.08 








Zero-order Correlation Matrix, Means and Standard Deviations for Organ Donation Study 
Variables 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Anger ---        
2. Negative Cognitions .34** ---       
3. Freedom Threat .47** -.23** ---      
4. Perceived Descriptive Norm -.06 -.08 -.01 ---     
5. Perceived Injunctive Norm -.16* -.05 -.07 .24** ---    
6. Message Elaboration -.24** -.15* -.29** .11 .30** ---   
7. Attitude -.26** -.23** -.26** .16* .50** .48** ---  
8. Intention -.13** -.18** -.10 .17** .22** .28** .50** --- 
Mean 1.35 1.01 2.62 2.89 3.98 3.49 3.87 2.65 
SD 0.64 1.45 0.94 0.95 0.77 0.88 0.89 1.21 
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APPENDIX A: STUDY 1 MESSAGES 
Alcohol Consumption, Descriptive Norm Condition, High Forceful Language 
Most Illini drink moderately.  
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 71% reported drinking 4 or fewer drinks the 
last time they partied.  
If you drink, you must drink responsibly. You simply have to do it. 
Alcohol Consumption, Descriptive Norm Condition, Low Forceful Language 
Most Illini drink moderately.  
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 71% reported drinking 4 or fewer drinks the 
last time they partied.  
If you drink, consider drinking responsibly. The choice is up to you. 
Alcohol Consumption, Injunctive Norm Condition, High Forceful Language 
Most Illini think you should drink moderately. 
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 71% strongly agree that other students should 
limit the number of drinks when they party to 4 or fewer.  
If you drink, you must drink responsibly. You simply have to do it. 
Alcohol Consumption, Injunctive Norm Condition, Low Forceful Language 
Most Illini think you should drink moderately. 
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 71% strongly agree that other students should 
limit the number of drinks when they party to 4 or fewer.  




Exercise, Descriptive Norm Condition, High Forceful Language 
Most Illini exercise regularly. 
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 65% reported exercising for 3 or more hours 
per week. 
You must exercise regularly. You simply have to do it. 
Exercise, Descriptive Norm Condition, Low Forceful Language 
Most Illini exercise regularly. 
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 65% reported exercising for 3 or more hours 
per week. 
Consider exercising regularly. The choice is up to you. 
Exercise, Injunctive Norm Condition, High Forceful Language 
Most Illini think you should exercise regularly. 
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 65% strongly agree that other students should 
exercise for 3 or more hours per week. 
You must exercise regularly. You simply have to do it. 
Exercise, Injunctive Norm Condition, Low Forceful Language 
Most Illini think you should exercise regularly. 
According to a recent survey of Illinois students, 65% strongly agree that other students should 
exercise for 3 or more hours per week. 





APPENDIX B: STUDY 1 MEASURES 
Descriptive Norm (Park et al., 2009; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Alcohol Consumption 
 Most University of Illinois students limit their alcohol consumption to 4 or fewer drinks 
when they party. 
 Most University of Illinois students do not go over 4 drinks in one occasion when they 
party. 
 Most University of Illinois students have 4 or fewer drinks when they party. 
Exercise 
 Most University of Illinois students make sure to exercise for at least 3 hours per week. 
 Most University of Illinois students exercise for at least 3 hours per week. 
 Most University of Illinois students spend at least 3 hours per week exercising. 
Injunctive Norm (Park et al., 2009; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Alcohol Consumption 
 Most University of Illinois students would approve of my limiting my alcohol 
consumption to 4 or fewer drinks when I party. 
 Most University of Illinois students would endorse my limiting my alcohol consumption 
to 4 drinks or fewer when I party. 
 Most University of Illinois students would support my limiting my alcohol consumption 





 Most University of Illinois students would endorse my exercising for at least 3 hours per 
week. 
 Most University of Illinois students would support my exercising for at least 3 hours per 
week. 
 Most University of Illinois students would approve of my exercising for at least 3 hours 
per week. 
Attitude (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Alcohol Consumption 
 Limiting my drinking to 4 drinks or fewer when I party is a good thing for me to do. 
 Limiting my drinking to 4 drinks or fewer when I party is beneficial. 
 Limiting my drinking to 4 drinks or fewer when I party is important.  
 Limiting my drinking to 4 drinks or fewer when I party is very useful to me. 
Exercise 
 Exercising for at least 3 hours per week is a good thing for me to do. 
 Exercising for at least 3 hours per week is beneficial. 
 Exercising for at least 3 hours per week is important. 
 Exercising for at least 3 hours per week is very useful to me. 
Behavioral Intention (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Alcohol Consumption 
 In the next week, I plan to limit my drinking to 4 drinks or fewer I party. 
 In the next two weeks, I plan to limit my drinking to 4 drinks or fewer when I party. 




 In the next week, I plan to exercise for at least 3 hours per week. 
 In the next two weeks, I plan to exercise for at least 3 hours per week. 
 In the next month, I plan to exercise for at least 3 hours per week. 
Freedom Threat (Dillard & Shen, 2005; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
 The message tried to make a decision for me.  
 The message tried to pressure me. 
 The message threatened my freedom to choose. 
 The message tried to manipulate me. 
 Did you feel aggravated while viewing this message? 
Anger (Dillard & Shen, 2005; 1 = none of this feeling to 4 = a great deal of this feeling) 





Message Processing (Stephenson & Palmgreen, 2001; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree) 
 Overall, how much did the message make you think about ways to [moderate your 
drinking/exercise regularly]? 
 Overall, how much did the message make you “think” rather than “feel”? 




 Overall, how much did the message make you think about how [drinking in 





APPENDIX C: STUDY 2 MESSAGES 
Organ Donation, Descriptive Norm Only, High Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
To date, more than half of all Americans have signed up to become organ donors. 
The need is real. You must join your state organ and tissue donor registry today! 
Organ Donation, Descriptive Norm Only, Low Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
To date, more than half of all Americans have signed up to become organ donors. 
The choice is yours. Consider joining your state organ and tissue donor registry today! 
Organ Donation, Injunctive Norm Only, High Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support organ donation registration. 




Organ Donation, Injunctive Norm Only, Low Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support organ donation registration. 
The choice is yours. Consider joining your state organ and tissue donor registry today! 
Organ Donation, DN X IN, High Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
To date, more than half of all Americans have signed up to become organ donors. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support organ donation registration. 
The need is real. You must join your state organ and tissue donor registry today! 
Organ Donation, DN X IN, Low Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
To date, more than half of all Americans have signed up to become organ donors. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support organ donation registration. 




Organ Donation, No Norm, High Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
The need is real. You must join your state organ and tissue donor registry today! 
Organ Donation, No Norm, Low Forceful Language 
More than 118,000 people in the United States are currently waiting for a lifesaving organ 
transplant. Registering as an organ donor can give life and hope to many people. A single donor 
can help save or improve the lives of as many as 25 people. 
The choice is yours. Consider joining your state organ and tissue donor registry today! 
Energy Conservation, Descriptive Norm Only, High Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 
To date, more than 70% of Americans have purchased energy-efficient light bulbs for their home. 




Energy Conservation, Descriptive Norm Only, Low Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 
To date, more than 70% of Americans have purchased energy-efficient light bulbs for their home. 
The choice is yours! Consider purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for your home today. 
Energy Conservation, Injunctive Norm Only, High Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs. 
The need is real! You must purchase energy efficient light bulbs for your home today. 
Energy Conservation, Injunctive Norm Only, Low Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs. 




Energy Conservation, DN X IN, High Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 
To date, more than 70% of Americans have purchased energy-efficient light bulbs for their home. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs. 
The need is real! You must purchase energy efficient light bulbs for your home today. 
Energy Conservation, DN X IN, Low Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 
To date, more than 70% of Americans have purchased energy-efficient light bulbs for their home. 
More than 90% of Americans say they strongly support purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs. 




Energy Conservation, No Norm, High Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 
The need is real! You must purchase energy efficient light bulbs for your home today. 
Energy Conservation, No Norm, Low Forceful Language 
Purchasing energy-efficient light bulbs for your home is an important way to reduce your 
household energy use. ENERGY STAR certified light bulbs are four times more energy efficient 
than traditional incandescent bulbs, last about 15 times longer, and can help cut home energy 
costs. 





APPENDIX D: STUDY 2 MEASURES 
Descriptive Norm (Park et al., 2009; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Energy Conservation 
 Most Americans have purchased energy efficient light bulbs for their homes. 
 Most Americans have bought energy efficient light bulbs for their homes. 
 Most Americans have invested in energy efficient light bulbs for their homes. 
Organ Donation 
 Most Americans are registered organ donors.  
 Most Americans have signed up to be an organ donor. 
 Most Americans have joined the organ donor registry. 
Injunctive Norm (Park et al., 2009; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Energy Conservation 
 Most Americans would endorse me purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my home. 
 Most Americans would support me purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my home. 
 Most Americans would approve of me purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my 
home. 
Organ Donation 
 Most Americans would approve of my registering as an organ donor. 
 Most Americans would endorse me registering as an organ donor. 




Attitude (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Energy Conservation 
 Purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my home is a good thing for me to do. 
 Purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my home is beneficial. 
 Purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my home is important. 
 Purchasing energy efficient light bulbs for my home is very useful to me. 
Organ Donation 
 Registering as an organ donor is a good thing for me to do. 
 Registering as an organ donor is beneficial. 
 Registering as an organ donor is important.  
 Registering as an organ donor is very useful to me. 
Behavioral Intention (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
Energy Conservation 
 In the next month, I plan to purchase energy efficient light bulbs for my home.  
 In the next 3 months, I plan to purchase energy efficient light bulbs for my home.  
 In the next 6 months, I plan to purchase energy efficient light bulbs for my home.  
Organ Donation 
 In the next month, I plan to register as an organ donor. 
 In the next 3 months, I plan to register as an organ donor. 




Freedom Threat (Dillard & Shen, 2005; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) 
 The message tried to make a decision for me.  
 The message tried to pressure me. 
 The message threatened my freedom to choose. 
 The message tried to manipulate me. 
 Did you feel aggravated while viewing this message? 
Anger (Dillard & Shen, 2005; 1 = none of this feeling to 4 = a great deal of this feeling) 





Message Processing (Stephenson & Palmgreen, 2001; 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly 
agree) 
 Overall, how much did the message make you think about ways to [moderate your 
drinking/exercise regularly]? 
 Overall, how much did the message make you “think” rather than “feel”? 
 Overall, how much did the message make you think about the benefits of [moderate 
drinking/regular exercise]? 
 Overall, how much did the message make you think about how [drinking in 
moderation/exercising regularly] might affect your life? 
